Thomas M. Cooley, Liberal Jurisprudence, And
The Law Of Libel, 1868-1884
Norman L. Rosenberg*
During the past two decades, and especially since 1970,
there has been a steadily growing interest in American legal history.1 This new interest has helped to redirect attention to the
work of nineteenth century legal figures, including Thomas M.
Cooley. Most scholars once dismissed Cooley as a simplistic
apologist for laissez faire economics and late nineteenth century
capitalism.' Recently, however, legal and constitutional historians have realized that his legal thought was much more complex.8 In part, this article seeks to extend recent work on Cooley

and to examine his ideas and judicial opinions on freedom of
expression and the law of libel. Cooley's views about free expression, defamation law, and American journalism are excellent
examples of the development and transformation of liberal ideas
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1. See, e.g., Gordon, Introduction:J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography,10 L. & Soc'Y REV. 9 (1975). Much of this "new
legal history"-including the work of Duncan Kennedy, Morton Horwitz, and Mark
Tushnet-has concerned itself with integrating legal history and critical theory. See
Abrahams, The Emergence of Critical Social Theory in American Jurisprudence:An
Introduction to ProfessorRosenberg's Perspective, 4 U. PUGET SD. L. REv. 39 (1980).
2. See, e.g., C. JAcos, LAw WRrrI
AND THE COURTS (1954); B. Twiss, LAWYEas
AND THE CONSIrUTION (1942).
3. See, e.g., P. PALxmuDN, A CovENAr WITH DEAm 249-73 (1975); G. WHrrE, THE
AMmBcAN JUICIAL TRuDTON 109-22 (1975); Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and the Michigan Supreme Court: 1865-1885, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97 (1966); Jones, Thomas M.
Cooley and "Laissez Faire Constitutionalism":A Reconsideration,53 J. AM. His?. 751
(1967).
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tion, Cooley's attempts to resolve the problems raised by some
of the earliest mass media libel cases offer some historical perspective on recent efforts to sort out the conflicting issues and
interests in political and public libel cases.
Thomas Cooley's labors merit special attention because he
approached the problem of libel and the press from two vantage
points. First, as a writer of numerous legal treatises, Cooley
served as one of the nineteenth century's most widely-read conceptualizers and "glossators." 6 One of America's first prominent
lawyer-academicians, Cooley sought to derive and articulate justifications for prevailing legal rules and to formulate and advocate modifications to those standards. Second, as a member of
the Michigan Supreme Court from 1864 to 1885, Cooley had the
opportunity to argue with his skeptical colleagues about the viability of his approach and to apply the theories of the treatisewriter to the concrete problems of the appellate judge. In his
application of legal rules to the realities of late-nineteenth century journalism, Thomas Cooley spoke to the problems of our
own time as well. A comparison of Cooley's early efforts as a
treatise-writer with his later work as a judge suggests that contemporary conflicts between libel law and freedom of the press
are not simply the result of improperly-framed rules or the
"conservatism" of President Nixon's Supreme Court appointees.' Ultimately, the dilemmas that faced Cooley, as well as
those that confronted the Supreme Court of the past fifteen
years, grow out of contradictions within the liberal marketplace
7
view of free expression.
I.
American liberals, including Thomas Cooley, have always
placed great importance on a series of supposedly self-regulating
4. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. Professor G. Edward White coined the term "glossator" to connote the important
role played by "lawyer intellectuals" in developing nineteenth century legal doctrines.
See G. WHITE, The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, in PATrERNS OF AmmicA
LEGAL THOUGHT

163, 165 (1978).

6. See, e.g., Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone:A Study in ConstitutionalPolicy-Making, 61 MINN. L. Rxv. 645 (1977); Frakt, Defamation Since Gertz v.Robert Welch, Inc.:
The Emerging Common Law, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 471 (1979).
7. See text accompanying notes 86-166 infra.
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marketplaces.8 Cooley's earliest and most influential treatise, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon
the Legislative Powers of the States of the American Union
(Constitutional Limitations),' became famous for its implicit
endorsement of a free, largely self-adjusting, economic marketplace. But Cooley's legalistic version of "marketplace theology"
was more than a set of arbitrary doctrines which cynically or
unwittingly sanctified the growth of capitalism and the profits of
the robber barons. 10 In his writings, Cooley also glorified several
other "liberal marketplaces," including the intellectual and the
political. In Cooley's view, maintenance of these three marketplaces-the economic, the intellectual, and the political-provided the essential framework for the continued development of a liberal republic.
Writing, in Constitutional Limitations, about freedom of
expression and American journalism, Cooley often used analogies from the expanding economic marketplace to bolster his
arguments that similar benefits would follow from the free flow
of ideas and from the unhindered clash of rival political forces."
Cooley believed that if political aspirants and ideas could freely
compete for support, Americans would enjoy the steady advance
of social and political wisdom; America's culture, government,
and economy would thrive. And so, the task of lawmakers was to
see that legal institutions released, rather than restricted, the
flow of individual ideas into the intellectual marketplace.12 Both
as a treatise-writer and as a judge, Cooley sought to promote
intellectual and political development by removing illiberal
restrictions from public debate and from the primary channel of
popular communication, the American press.
8. For an analysis of liberalism in terms of "self-regulating" marketplaces, see G.
WILLS, NIXON AGONISTES (2d ed. 1979).
9. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTrrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868) [hereinafter

cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATONS]. Cooley also discussed libel and freedom of expression, though much more briefly, in his TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1879) [hereinafter cited as TORTS]. (All citations, unless otherwise noted, are to the first editions of
Cooley's treatises.)
10. This was the view of older studies. See, e.g., note 2 supra.
11. See text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
12. The thesis that nineteenth century legal doctrines were designed to release individual energies, particularly in the economic realm, was first developed in J. W. HURST,
LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES

(1956). For a recent effort to join the intellectual and economic marketplaces, see Coase,
The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EcoN. REv. 384 (1974).
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Traditionally, libel law was the most significant legal check
upon political discussion and the press. Thomas Cooley, therefore, devoted considerable attention to eliminating what he considered the antiliberal features of defamation law. In Constitutional Limitations,13 Cooley began to question the wisdom of
common law doctrines.
Although some Jeffersonian opponents of the national Sedition Act of 1798 had articulated broad, theoretical defenses of
free expression," most of the leading spokesmen for the Democratic-Republican party ultimately supported libel doctrines,
especially in the area of civil defamation, similar to those
endorsed by their Federalist adversaries. Once partisan differences over the Sedition Act ended, prominent political and legal
figures agreed that libelous falsehoods about individual political
leaders could not be permitted.1 5 Early nineteenth century legal
authorities, such as James Kent and Joseph Story, demanded
that courts retain the sturdy barrier of defamation law against
those who sought to traffic in political libels. Judges and commentators feared that if courts tolerated circulation of libelous
falsehoods in the political arena, voters might be fooled into
rejecting the "best men" in favor of less qualified candidates or
even totally unscrupulous demagogues. Nearly every judicial
decision endorsed the principle of strict liability, a legal doctrine
that neatly reinforced the "deferential-elitist" spirit of early
nineteenth-century political culture. This theory of libel law
implied that most citizens lacked the political sophistication to
detect the lies and hyperboles of wily propagandists."
Early American judges and legal commentators viewed partisan newspapers as the most dangerous source of libelous political attacks. Although some Americans might consider the politi13.
IN

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

supra note 9.

14. On the "Jeffersonian libertarians," see L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 258-97 (1963). Although some Jeffersonians penned sweep-

ing attacks on the Sedition Act, most carefully qualified their own theories of free
expression. See Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 109; Rosenberg, The Law of Political Libel and Freedom of
Press in Nineteenth Century America: An Interpretation,17 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 336
(1973).
15. See, e.g., King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113, 135-42 (N.Y. 1829); T. COOPER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF LIBEL AND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 42-47, 109-12 (1830); 3 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 597-98 (1833); Holt, The
Law of Libel, 5 AM. Q. REV. 71 (1829).
16. See Rosenberg, The New Law of Political Libel: A HistoricalPerspective, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 1141, 1143-46 (1975).
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cal press the great security of our liberty, Joseph Story
complained to a colleague at Harvard Law School, "it seems to
be forgotten that the same instrument which can preserve, may
be employed to destory.' 1 7 The great task of clear-headed citizens was "to make the mass of the people see their true interests, there being so many political demagogues, and so many
party presses, that are in league to deceive them."' 8 Such fears
about the dangers of "licentious" presses were expressed not
only in political libel cases but also in a number of other early
nineteenth century libel decisions which rejected any sort of special legal privileges for the press. Thus, in 1813, Judge James
Kent held a printer absolutely responsible for a libelous piece,
even though the newspaperman had identified the author and
had merely provided him access to the public. "The injury is
inflicted by the press, which, like other powerful engines, is
mighty for mischief as well as for good." 9 Kent concluded that
the printer's claim for some type of legal protection for inadvertent libels was "as destitute of foundation in law as it [was]
repugnant to principles of public policy. 2 0° And in 1825, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court compared the newspaper operator to the person who stored firearms at home: both possessed
dangerous instruments and must be responsible for all harmful
consequences.2 1
The early nineteenth century law of libel thus made few
concessions to journalists who published untruthful, and in some
cases truthful, political criticism. In criminal prosecutions for
libel, most jurisdictions employed the so-called "truth-plus standard" first articulated by Alexander Hamilton and James Kent:
defendants were required to demonstrate not only that they had
published the truth but also that they had done so with "good
motives" and for "justifiable ends. ' 22 In civil defamation cases,
most courts held that proof of the truth of libelous political
charges, by itself, could be a complete justification, but some
even applied the more restrictive Hamiltonian standard in both
17. Letter from J. Story to J. Ashmun (Feb. 13, 1831) reprinted in 2 LIFE
TERS OF JOSEPH STORY 50

AND

LET-

(W.W. Story ed. 1851).

18. Id. at 49.
19. Dole v. Lyon, 10 Johns. 447, 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
20. Id.; see Tillotson v. Cheetham, 2 Johns. 63, 74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806).
21. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825).
22. 1 TE LAW PRACTICE OF ALZSxANE HAMILTON 808-42 (J. Goebel, Jr. ed. 1964)
(Hamilton's views); cf. People v. Croswell, 1 Cai. R. 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803) (Kent's

views).
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civil and criminal cases.2"
Insistence upon strict liability for libelous falsehoods, even
in newspaper stories about public officials and candidates, constituted a significant exception to the general trend in nineteenth century tort law. In other areas, courts generally rejected
strict liability in favor of less stringent standards such as negligence. 24 In a few types of defamation cases, particularly those
arising out of business dealings, some courts did reject strict liability,2 5 but most American courts refused to concede any privilege when newspapers and periodicals published libelous falsehoods about political leaders or private citizens.2 When it came
to the reputations of prominent citizens, the press remained an
inherently dangerous instrument.
Beginning his political and legal career as a Jacksonian
Democrat, and as a supporter of free soil, free trade, and free
public education, Thomas Cooley found traditional libel doctrines in direct conflict with his theory of free expression, a theory which grew out of his ideas about the relationship between
the liberal marketplaces and America's future development. He
devoted an entire chapter of Constitutional Limitations to
"Liberty of Speech and of the Press," and he took direct aim on
English and early American authorities.2 After a review of
English constitutional history, Cooley concluded that Sir William Blackstone's famous definition, equating liberty of expression with liberation from prior restraints, was woefully
inadequate.2
23. See Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionalityof Limitations on Truth as a
Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. Rav. 789, 790-805 (1964).
24. See M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 85-99
(1977).
25. For a brief, contemporary analysis, see CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note
9, at 425-26; TORTs, supra note 9, at 216-17.
26. State courts consistently rejected the argument that printing non-malicious
falsehoods about political figures should be privileged. See, e.g., Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. 1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809); King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113 (N.Y. 1829). Some courts did make an
exception for bona fide petitions to proper authorities but not for libelous stories published in the press. See, e.g., Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809);
Gray v. Pentland, 4 Serg. & Rawl. 420 (Pa. 1819); Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. 129 (Vt.
1802).
27. See CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 414-65.
28. . . . mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is secured
by constitutional provisions, in as much as of words to be uttered orally there
can be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the press might be rendered a
mockery and a delusion ... if, while every man was at liberty to publish
whatever he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for
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Post-Revolutionary adaptations of English doctrines also
failed to satisfy Cooley. He contended that the national Sedition
Act of 1798, although it rejected common law orthodoxy by permitting truth as a defense, still violated the first amendment. He
argued that it was "impossible to conceive at the present time
• . . the passage of any similar repressive statute. 2 9 Cooley conceded that public debates might become impassioned and that
some people would call for criminal libel prosecutions, but he
counseled that "the evil likely to spring from the violent discussion will probably be less, and its correction by public sentiment
more speedy, than if the terrors of the law were brought to bear
to prevent this discussion. ' 80 Cooley also believed that civil suits
for damages, which were far more frequent than criminal prosecutions, could also infringe upon liberty of expression. He
insisted that courts become more sensitive to complex issues
raised by libel suits in which political leaders sued their critics
for defamation. 1
A one-time newspaper editor and an active political partisan
before becoming a judge, Cooley drew upon the ideas and the
spirit of Jacksonian political culture to bolster his critique of
existing libel doctrines.8 2 The new national parties of the Jacksonian era made politics a mass participant, or at least a mass
spectator, sport. Calling forth the loyalties of vast segments of
the white male population, this system of mass politics won over
most mid-nineteenth century political theorists. Rejecting traditional fears about the dangers of factions, political analysts,
including Thomas Cooley, viewed permanent conflict between
organized parties in the political marketplace as an essential
harmless publication.
Id. at 421. When discussing the use of prosecutions for libel, Cooley placed more blame
upon British officials, who enforced the laws "with great harshness beyond any reasonable construction which those rules would bear," than on the common law of libel itself.
Id. at 427. Throughout his career as a treatise-writer and as a judge, Thomas Cooley
insisted that common law principles, properly interpreted, fully protected freedom of
discussion. See text accompanying notes 62-84, 127-30 infra.
29. CONsTITUTONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 428.
30. Id. at 429.
31. Id. at 435-41.
32. From the outset of party conflict in Michigan, members of the Democratic Party
favored more wide-open political debate and less restrictive libel laws than members of
the Whig Party. For an exchange of views at the state constitutional convention of 1835,
especially the opinions of William Woodbridge, a Whig leader, and the Democratic chieftain, John Norvell, see THE MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1835-36: DEBATES
AND PROCEEDINGS 290-96 (H.M. Dorr ed. 1940). See R. FORMISANO, THE BIRTH OF MASS
POLITICAL PARTIES 107 (1971).

University of Puget Sound Law Review

56

[Vol. 4:49

part of American government."3
Cooley also endorsed free-swinging political debates, and he
extolled the rationality of most voters and the ultimate integrity
of the free marketplace of political ideas. He attributed the
Sedition Act's passage to the apprehensions of an earlier age, a
time when "the fabric of government was still new and untried,
and when many men seemed to think that the breath of heated
party discussion might tumble it about their heads. '3 4 Fears
about the bad tendency of party polemics could no longer justify
such limitations on the right of free expression. Constitutional
guarantees, Cooley argued, insured "every citizen at any time"
the liberty to "bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their
conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people have
conferred upon them. '3 5 Repressive libel laws only frustrated
translation of public opinion into public policy and undermined
the operation of the new system of popular politics. Traditional
common law restraints could easily become tools of political
repression. In "times of high party excitement," Cooley feared,
the party in power might be tempted "to bolster up wrongs and
sustain abuses and oppressions by crushing adverse criticism
and discussion. '"36 On the basis of both republican principles and
political realities, Cooley urged elimination of outdated libel
laws. He believed citizens should recognize that enlightened
public sentiment would provide a safer and more effective remedy for libelous publications than the old system of legal
controls.
Although between 1798 and 1800 some of the "Jeffersonian
libertarians" had expressed similar sentiments about free
expression and public opinion, virtually all of them had qualified
their broad rhetoric when it came to specific discussions of defamation law and to personal attacks upon the reputations of the
"best men. 3 7 In contrast, Cooley believed that the reputations
of public officials should not receive the same, and certainly no
33. Most political historians now agree that between 1776 and the early 1840s Amer-

ican political culture changed in this manner. See R.

HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY

(1969); Formisano, Deferential-ParticipantPolitics: The Early Republic's Political Culture, 1789-1840, 68 AM. PoL. Sci. Rav. 473 (1974).
34. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 427.
35. Id. at 422.
36. Id. at 429.
37. N. Rosenberg, The Law of Libel and Partisan Politics in the Early Republic
(unpublished manuscript, 1980).
SYsTEM
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greater, legal protection than the good names of ordinary citizens. He felt that people who entered public life should expect
to submit their actions and characters to searching, and sometimes even libelous, criticism."
Cooley also argued that the American newspaper press
deserved liberation from the burdens of traditional defamation
law. His views about American newspapers, like his ideas about
politics, contrasted with those of early nineteenth century jurists
and represented the high tide of nineteenth century libertarian
thought. Although Cooley acknowledged the venality of some
newspapers, ConstitutionalLimitations also included a glowing
sketch of the American press." Differing sharply with Kent and
Story, Cooley praised political newspapers for their progressive
contributions to public enlightenment. He claimed the political
press was "gradually becoming more just, liberal, and dignified
in its dealings with political opponents, and vituperation is
much less common, reckless, and bitter now." The daily newspaper, he continued, "may be said to be the chief educator of the
people; its influence is potent in every legislative body; it gives
tone and direction to public sentiment on each important subject as it arises." He also praised journalists for reporting events
from "every civilized country" and for scrutinizing the conduct
of politicians and any one else "sufficiently interesting or notorious to become an object of public interest. ' 40 Cooley went even
further in his General Principles of Constitutional Law,
assigning the press quasi-constitutional status. The press, he
argued, operated as "a public convenience, which gathers up the
intelligence of the day to lay before its readers, notifies coming
events, gives warning against disasters, and in various ways contributes to the happiness, comfort, safety, and protection of the
people." 4 1 "[I]n a constitutional point of view," the press enabled "the citizen to bring any person in authority, any public
38. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 431-41; TORTS, supra note 9, at
217-19.
39. See CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 454. Cooley included a
lengthy excerpt from an opinion by Judge Samuel Nelson of the New York Supreme
Court which condemned the press for its tendency "to pamper a depraved public appetite or taste." Id. at 453 (quoting Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill 510, 513 (N.Y. 1842)).
Cooley disputed Judge Nelson's sweeping indictment, claiming that the press did not
deserve such venom.
40. CONSTrrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 451-52, 456 n.4.

41. T. COOLEY, THE GENzRAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 274 (1880) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL PRINCIPLES].
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corporation or agency, or even the government in all its departments, to the bar of public opinion." 2
Cooley recognized that the American press had changed
since the early days of the republic. By mid-century, the United
States had far more newspapers and periodicals than in 1810;
these publications provided their readers with larger amounts
and greater diversity of information than the small, largely political journals of the Jeffersonian era."' Cooley enthusiastically
endorsed these changes and lauded the positive contributions of
the press. "Every party has its newspaper organs; every shade of
opinion. . . has its representative; every locality has its press to
advocate its claims, and advance its interests . . ." Evidence
that the nation's presses were prospering buoyed Cooley's liberal
romantic faith that the mid-nineteenth century newspaper was a
medium of mass communication that could bind together people
in diverse places and from different socio-economic circumstances. The new mass media, Cooley hoped, could provide a
non-coercive, largely self-regulating means to temper the possessive individualism that was at the heart of liberal society. He
also anticipated that the press would help to combat difficulties
raised by the great size of the American republic. Through specialized publications, the press would enable people with similar
occupations and interests, such as merchants or spiritualists, to
communicate with one another at great distances. In short, Cooley praised the mid-nineteenth century press as prime force in
the expansion and improvement of almost every aspect of American life. Outdated laws that unnecessarily hampered the flow of
ideas and opinions threatened to slow the United States' march
into the modern world.' 5
42. Id.
43. See F. MOTT, AMERcAN JouRNALsmM: A HIsTORY: 1690-1960, at 215-52 (3d ed.
1962); M. SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SocIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPrs
12-60 (1978); B. WEISBERGER, THE AMERIcAN NEWSPAPERMAN 69-82 (1961);
Crouthamel, The Newspaper Revolution in New York, 1830-60, 45 N.Y. HIST. 91 (1964).

44.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

supra note 9, at 452.

45. Id. at 451-52. Thomas Cooley, in Dean Wellington's terms, was a thorough-going
"consequentialist." See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1115
(1979). With considerable passion, Cooley argued that a variety of beneficial consequences result from a healthy marketplace of ideas. Thus, Cooley did not justify his view
of free expression solely on what has been called "the marketplace theory of truth," the
Mills-Holmesian notion that the marketplace should provide the battleground for the
contest between truth and falsehood. See Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First
Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Cantor,64 VA. L. Rv. 263, 268-72 (1978).
In Cooley's view, the marketplace of ideas was not simply a vehicle for finding truth; in
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In Cooley's view, supporters of neo-Blackstonian libel doctrines ignored the value of the marketplace of ideas and the
important role of the modern press. In other areas of law, he
complained, courts and legal theorists had acknowledged the
reality of technological and economic progress. "The railway has
become the successor of the king's highway, and the plastic rules
of the common law have accommodated themselves to the new
conditions of things." Yet, "the changes accomplished by the
public press seem to have passed unnoticed in the law.""' Except
for a few minor legislative and constitutional modifications, "the
publisher of the daily paper occupies to-day the position in the
courts that the village gossip and retailer of scandal occupied
two hundred years ago, with no more privilege and no more
' 47
protection.
Cooley argued that American courts must bring libel law
into line with new political and social realities. The mere existence of restrictive libel doctrines might tempt venal party leaders to defy popular opinion and to attempt legal suppression of
political dissent. Inevitably, the result would be the kind of popular and constitutional tempest that a system of free debate
helped to prevent." In addition, courts should recognize that old
libel doctrines must be adjusted to the new realities, if the
American press and the American Republic were to reach their
fullest potential.
Cooley argued, for example, that the rapid development of
mass communications systems during the nineteenth century
made it unreasonable to hold newspaper publishers legally
responsible for all libelous falsehoods in their papers. Strict liability ignored the essential dynamics of the journalistic marketplace-the buyer-seller relationship. Readers, the sovereign buyers of information, "demanded of the newspaper publisher. ., a
complete summary of the events transpiring in the world, public
or private, . . . and [the journalist] who does not comply with
conjunction with several other "marketplaces," it was the very foundation for a prosperous and progressive republic. Seen in these terms, the emergence of a free marketplace of
ideas, and a free press, become a part of a larger historical process that some contemporary liberal social scientists label "modernization." See R. BROWN, MODERNIZATION 11719 (1976); B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FRmDOM OF EXPRESSION 44-48 (1975). For a different perspective, that of a self-proclaimed "Marxist outlaw," see A. GOULDNER, THE DIALECTIC OF IDEALOGY AND TECHNOLOGY 96-137 (1976).
46. CONsTIrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 452.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 429. See text accompanying notes 57-61 infra.
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The reading pub-

lic, Cooley continued, "demand and expect accounts" about a
wide range of events; it was impossible "that these shall be given
in all cases without matters being mentioned derogatory to individuals." 50 Cooley strongly suggested that a newspaper publisher
should be able to reprint items from reputable sources, such as
wire services, without fear of legal difficulties. But, in the end,
he was forced to concede that firmly established precedent held
newspapers "to the same rigid responsibility with any other person who makes injurious communications." 51 If the press wished
special protection, "it would seem that publishers of news must
appeal to the protection of public opinion, or to the
legislature." 5 2
But in cases where libelous material related to the activities
of governmental officials and other public people, Cooley
believed courts could easily invoke common law principles to
relieve the press from some of the burdens of strict liability.
Because criminal libel prosecutions occurred so infrequently,
Cooley was most concerned about civil defamation suits. He was
particularly critical of the leading American precedent, King v.
Root,5" an 1829 case in which the New York Court of Errors
imposed strict liability for libelous falsehoods, even when they
concerned the official conduct of governmental officers. Such a
rule, he complained, was not "very satisfactory to those who
claim the utmost freedom of discussion in public affairs."" In
deciding the Root case, he argued, the New York Court of Errors
wrongfully assumed that "no public consideration had in any
way been involved" and erroneously decided that there was "no
middle ground between absolute immunity for falsehood and the
application of the same strict rules which prevail" in purely private libel cases.55 Cooley took some solace in his belief that "the
general public sentiment and the prevailing customs allow a
greater freedom of discussion" and hold a newspaper publisher
"less strictly to what he may be able to justify as true."" But he
49. CONSTrrTUIONAL LImrrATIONS, supra note 9, at 452.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 454.
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at 457.
4 Wend. 113 (N.Y. 1829).
CONsTrrutONAL LImrrATONS, supra note 9, at 438.
Id.

56. Id.

1980]

Thomas M. Cooley

also urged acceptance of legal doctrines which could bridge the
gulf between these prevailing customs and libel law.
Thomas Cooley became, and remains, most famous for his
jeremiads on the dangers of governmental power. Cooley firmly
believed that, in a liberal republic, the powers of the state must
remain limited. For example, even though he had supported the
antislavery cause before 1860 and abolitionism during the Civil
War, Cooley saw ratification of the fourteenth amendment in
1867 as the end of the crusade for the rights of black people. By
purging slavery, the war had secured equality for all Americans,
including blacks; in Cooley's view, the fourteenth amendment
merely confirmed this reality and granted the national govern57
ment no new powers which it could use to assist black people.
Similarly, his activist stance toward the protection of political
speech was intended not so much to quicken the engine of government-one of the policy goals behind the libertarian libel
decision of the Warren court in the 1960s-but primarily to
provide further obstacles to governmental activity.
Thus, Cooley's ideas on the importance of free expression
nicely dovetailed with his larger emphasis upon the necessity for
minimizing the opportunities for the use of governmental power.
As the historian David Potter has observed, "the marked American reliance on endless discussion as a means of finding solutions for controversies reflects less a faith in the powers of
rational persuasion than an unwillingness to let anything reach a
point where authority will have to be invoked." 5 ' Although Professor Potter's sweeping thesis is too broad, it captures an essential tenet of Cooley's view of free expression. Like many other
nineteenth century liberals, Cooley valued the "marketplace of
ideas" as a safety valve for public and private tensions. People
who talked out their problems were less likely to meet later on
the streets as enemies. The process of free expression enabled
citizens to release their anger in words and print, rather than in
clashes requiring mobilization of governmental power to restore
public order. 60 Moreover, if political leaders had to wait until the
people and the party presses had debated every political issue at
57. P. PALUDAN, supra note 3, at 260-70.
58. The decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, for example, cannot be separated from the drive for civil rights legislation. See Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic
Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REv. 315 (1965).
59. D. PorrEa,
FaRamOM AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN AMERICAN LIFE 14 (1976).
60. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 429.
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full length, the engine of government would generally be at a
slow idle, remaining in neutral until a coherent public opinion
formed. Finally, it seemed axiomatic to Cooley that a political
culture based upon a wide freedom of public discussion would
allow citizens to detect and remedy governmental abuses more
quickly than in one where restrictive laws limited the force of
political criticism. In a variety of ways, then, Cooley thought
enlightened libel laws helped to limit the powers of government
and to expand the self-correcting mechanisms of the political
and intellectual marketplaces. 1
In his attempts to liberalize libel law, Cooley constantly
swore allegiance to existing common law doctrines. The changes
he proposed, Cooley insisted, were not simply necessary judicial
responses to external pressures; they were logically consistent
with the nation's common law heritage. Properly defined, Cooley
asserted, freedom of the press meant not only liberation from
prior restraints, but "complete immunity for the publication, so
long as it is not harmful in its character, when tested by such
standards as the law affords."' 62 To find these legal standards,
Cooley would 'look to the common law rules which were in force
when the constitutional guarantees were established."Is
If Cooley's approach to libel law showed both "instrumentalist" and "formalistic" styles of legal reasoning," his formalism was, by his own admission, not based upon slavish devotion
to earlier libel decisions. For Cooley, the common law of defamation consisted of general principles and logically related rules.
Common law doctrines, he insisted, were not fixed in stone: the
common law was "plastic." 65 This metaphor, however, also sug61. Some of this remained implicit, rather than explicit, in Cooley's analysis. For an
example of the more systematic development of the nineteenth century liberal faith in
the marketplace of ideas, see F. GasMKE, NATuRE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INsTrruTIONS
43-46, 399-406 (J. Ward ed. 1968) (1st ed. n.p. 1848).
62. TORTS, supra note 9, at 218.
63. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS, supra note 9, at 422.
64. On the distinction between "instrumentalism" and "formalism" in nineteenth
century law, see M. HoRwrrz, supra note 24, at 16-30, 253-66. Cooley's approach to legal
decision-making should caution against the acceptance of any simple model of legal history in which pre-Civil War law is instrumentalist in nature while post-Civil War law is
highly formalistic. As one somewhat skeptical commentator has noted, such a model has
already gained considerable support. Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law,
1978 MARXIsT PRSslECTVS 96, 98. See Scheiber, Instrumentalismand Property Rights:
A Reconsideration of American "Styles of Judicial Reasoning" in the 19th Century,
1975 Wisc. L. REv. 1.
65. CONSTrrMoNAL LIMiTATIONS, supra note 9, at 452.
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gested some limits to Cooley's instrumentalism: old legal rules

could be reworked and remolded, but they were not supposed to
be broken arbitrarily or bent in any convenient direction., Even
though Cooley suggested that the press should be able to print
reports from other papers without fear of liability, he also conceded that precedent barred judicial adoption of such protection. 7 But in other areas of libel law, Cooley did not restrict
himself to such a formalistic approach. Judges, he argued, possessed considerable latitude to interpret established doctrines in
more libertarian directions than those taken by jurists of the
Revolutionary era. More important, Cooley believed courts had
a constitutional responsibility to protect the right of free expression. In his view, adoption of the common law rule of "conditional privilege" offered the means by which judges could fulfill
their responsibilities to common law orthodoxy, constitutional
commands, and the needs of a progressive liberal society.
Cooley believed the common law doctrine of conditional
privilege would give new vitality to the guarantees of free
expression that had been included in virtually every state constitution, as well as in the first amendment to the national charter.
These constitutional provisions, he contended, were meant to
stop "those in authority from making use of the machinery of
the law to prevent full discussion of political and other matters
in which the public are concerned." 68 Courts should not interpret them narrowly. But if Cooley was not a neo-Blackstonian
restrictionist like Chancellor Kent, neither was he an early advocate of the absolutist position championed by Justices Black and
Douglas during the 1960s. 9 Cooley's doctrine of conditional
privilege was not designed to eliminate entirely the law of political libel; but it was intended to expand the legal meaning of
"liberty of expression."
The term "privileged," as applied to a communication alleged
to be libellous [sic], means generally that the circumstances
under which it was made were such as to rebut the legal inference of malice, and to throw upon the plaintiff the burden of
offering some evidence of its existence beyond the mere falsity
66. On Cooley's concern with consistency, see G.E. WHrrE, supra note 3, at 115-22.

67.

CONSTITUTIONAL LimrrAMrONS,

supra note 9, at 455-56.

68. TORTS, supra note 9, at 217.
69. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
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of the charge."

Cooley would place this burden upon all libel plaintiffs who were
public officials or candidates for public office. And, because he
believed that most readers demanded that the press critically
discuss a wide range of "public" issues, he also urged extending
the rule of conditional privilege to "all cases where the matter
7' 1
discussed is one of general public interest.
In Cooley's view, "conditional privilege" was more than a
common law rule: in republican America it had become part of
the constitutional guarantees of free expression. There were, he
argued, "special cases where, for some reason of general public

policy, the publication is claimed to be privileged, and where
consequently, it may be supposed to be within the constitutional
protection. ' '72 In these constitutionally-protected situations, a
plaintiff could not maintain a suit for civil libel "without proof
of express malice." The right of free expression required a conditional privilege because of a public "duty" to speak out which
70. CONSTrrTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 425. For an exposition of the law
of conditional privilege prior to 1964, see 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§
5.25-.28 (1956). See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 83-93 (1978).
71. TORTS, supra note 9, at 218. Here and dissenting in Atkinson v. Detroit Free
Press Co., 46 Mich. 341, 9 N.W. 501 (1881), Cooley seemed to advocate something akin
to the law of "public libel" as expounded by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Coleman v.
MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908), a decision that relied heavily upon Cooley's
doctrines, and by the United States Supreme Court in a series of cases beginning with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and culminating in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). This line of cases ultimately focused on the subject
matter of the alleged libelous story rather than the plaintiff's status as a "public" or
"private" person. Cooley's rationale for such an approach was that the "public demand
and expect accounts of every important meeting, of every important trial, and of all the
events which have a bearing upon trade and business, or upon political affairs. It is
impossible that these shall be given in all cases without matters being mentioned derogatory to individuals." CoNsrroNAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 454. One modern
commentator finds the "public interest" test also makes sense because publishers
"rarely, if ever, have been involved in libel actions in which the plaintiff was a private
individual and the defamatory statements concerned purely private matters." It is "reasonable to presume that everything published or broadcast, including coverage of private
persons, involves only matters of general public interest." Ashdown, supra note 6, at 667.
See Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle:A ForthcomingNewsworthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 UCLA L. REv. 371 (1970).
Cooley ultimately backed away from a "public interest" or a "newsworthiness" test.
Although it would be tempting to draw a straight line from Cooley to Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., see, e.g., Schauer, supra note 45, at 288-89, such a neat progression
would ignore both the ambiguities in Cooley's initial position, and more importantly, his
final libel decisions on the Michigan Supreme Court. See text accompanying notes 14566 infra.

72.

CONSTrrTriONAL LIMITATIONS,

supra note 9, at 425.
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justified departure from the principle of strict liability in any
subsequent libel suit. For libels made on such "lawful occasions," the law would "throw upon the plaintiff the burden of
offering some evidence . . beyond the mere falsity of the
charge" that defamatory statements had been made "maliciously. '78 In order to effectuate the right of petition, for

instance, courts granted a conditional privilege to official remonstrances, and persons who sent petitions to proper authorities

would not be liable in civil suits "unless it be shown" that the
libels were "both false and malicious."' 74 The same type of privilege, Cooley reasoned, should apply to all citizens, including
newspaper people, who fulfilled their duty to speak out on political issues.78
The key issue in Cooley's formula, then, became defining
"malice;" yet, Cooley's treatises failed to enunciate a consistent
view of "malice," and his colleagues on the Michigan Supreme
Court thought his judicial opinions equally inconsistent.7
Although Cooley emphasized that he used the term malice in a
73. Id.

74. TORTS, supra note 9, at 215. See

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

supra note 9, at

431-34.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 9, at 435.
76. Both prior to and following New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the definition of
"malice" has been one of the murkiest problems in the always muddy law of defamation.

75.

Under the common law of libel, "malice" was an extremely vague concept. See R. PHLPS

& E.D. HAMILTON, LmaL:

RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIILrrIs

248-80 (2d ed. 1978). In New

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court established a constitutional definition of "actual
malice" to apply in cases involving public officials. The new constitutional standard in
political libel cases meant that plaintiff-public officials must show that a defendant had
published a libelous falsehood "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 27980 (1964). Later, the Court suggested that actual malice meant that there was a "high
degree of awareness of probable falsehood," Garrison v. Louisiana, 479 U.S. 64, 74
(1964), and that the publisher "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication," St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 729, 731 (1963). Such a constitutional
definition, the Court emphasized, was more restrictive than the common law definition.
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970). By jettisoning the
vague common law definition of malice, the new constitutional rule was supposed to
eliminate the "chilling effect" of self-censorship. See Schauer, Fear,Risk, and the First
Amendment, 58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 705-14 (1978).
But, in recent years, the Supreme Court has been no more consistent than Thomas
Cooley in applying a uniform definition of malice, and some see the Court retreating
from the strict standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a standard favorable to libel
defendants, to a more vague position similar to the common law view. See Frakt, supra
note 6, at 534, 585. For Justice Thomas Cooley's various definitions of malice, see text
accompanying notes 167-96, infra.
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'
"legal sense" rather than in its popular meaning of "ill will,"
this did not settle the ambiguities. He praised recent English
decisions on the privilege of "fair comment," a defense that
could protect expressions of "pure opinion" but not libelous misstatements of "fact, 7'1 and suggested that "only good faith and
just intention" limited the privilege to criticize public officials.7
To determine whether the privilege had been breached, a jury
could take into account the "nature of the charges made, and
the reasons which existed for making them."' 0 Later, he suggested a general rule designed to soothe the potential sting of
political defamation suits but maintain some legal restraints
over libelous attacks. Libel defendants, he argued, should not be
liable for civil damages when they discussed "in good faith, the
character, the habits, and mental and moral qualifications of any
person presenting himself, or presented by his friends, as a candidate for a public office." 8
Although Cooley's language might be read as nothing more
than a version of the English rule of "fair comment," he clearly
meant to develop broader protection than allowed under English
decisions. He argued, for example, that the English doctrine limiting criticism about "private" matters was "not sufficiently
comprehensive." He also clearly intended that his defense of
82
conditional privilege apply to libelous misstatements of "fact.
Despite their ambiguities as to the meaning of "malice,"
Cooley's treatises emphasized the expansive nature of both con-

77. TORTS supra note 9, at 209 n.3.
78. On the evolution of the defense of fair comment, see 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 70, at 456-63; Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEx. L. Rsv. 41 (1929). See Titus,
Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAw. L. Rsv. 1203 (1962). Most authorities hold that the landmark libel decisions by the United States Supreme Court since 1964 have, in effect, subsumed the old
defense of fair comment within the new constitutional law of defamation. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the
Press, 54 TEx. L. Rlv. 1221, 1240-59 (1976).

79. CONSTITUTIONAL
80. Id.

LIMITArlONS,

supra note 9, at 440.

81. TORTS, supra note 9, at 218.

82.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

supra note 9, at 440. There has been some disa-

greement among scholars over the differences between the defense of fair comment and
that of qualified privilege for libelous falsehoods. The majority view holds that because
Cooley's position called for protection of libelous falsehoods, it should not be called "fair
comment." Another view, however, asserts that the general privilege of fair comment has
a minority position that protects both "fact" and "opinion." See Eaton, The American
Law of Defamation through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical
Primer,61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1363 n.52 (1975).
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stitutional free speech-provisions and the common law doctrines
which supported such guarantees. Moreover, Cooley believed
that a rough approximation of the law of conditional privilege
had already been absorbed into the mid-century political culture
and that the political and intellectual marketplaces, rather than
the law courts, would correct most libelous statements and comments. In its publications "upon public events and public men,"
the American press
proceeds in all respects as though it were privileged ... and
the man who has a 'character to lose' presents himself for the
suffrages of his fellow citizens in the full reliance that detraction by the public press will be corrected through the same
instrumentality, and that unmerited abuse will react on the
public opinion in his favor.8s
But what about those occasions when the courts, not the
marketplace, would be called upon to correct breaches of conditional privilege? Could common law doctrines and principles
provide wise judges with clear and consistent answers? Thomas
Cooley, like other members of the late nineteenth century legal
elite, claimed that law "was a science, governed by axioms; one
discovered the axioms, articulated and synthesized them, then
applied them to resolve controversies. Solutions were evident,
lines could be drawn, rules could be made."" The common law
scholar, Cooley argued, could bring certainty to American jurisprudence. 8 But during his tenure as a Justice of the Michigan
Supreme Court from 1864 to 1885, Cooley found that the task of
bringing certainty to libel law and to constitutional guarantees
of free expression was not simple.
Thomas Cooley's approach to libel law, as a member of the
Michigan Supreme Court, deserves attention for several reasons.
First, a close study of Cooley's opinions shows his inability to
develop any clear, consistent approach to cases involving defamation and freedom of expression. Second, Cooley's confrontation with the social and legal meaning of public libel law highlights the contradictions within his marketplace liberalism.
Increasingly, Cooley began to temper his earlier enthusiasm
about self-regulating intellectual marketplaces and the free flow
of ideas. As he struggled to hold together his liberal faiths, Coo83. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS, supra note 9, at 455-56 n.4.
84. G. WHIrrE, supra note 3, at 121.

85. Id.
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ley authorized deeper and deeper legal incursions into the giveand-take of political debate.
II.
Justice Cooley did not, in any event, suddenly turn Michigan's libel laws in a libertarian direction. For a number of years,
in fact, he had few chances to review any libel cases at all. During Cooley's first twelve years of service, the Michigan Supreme
Court heard only two libel appeals. More important, his colleagues, particularly Justice James Campbell, resisted any
attempt to write Cooley's ideas about conditional privilege into
Michigan's case law. In the earliest newspaper libel decision of
Cooley's judicial career, however, his colleagues did prove willing
to offer some relief to "responsible" publishers. In Detroit Daily
Post Co. v. McArthur,6 in which the press did not raise the
issue of conditional privilege but tried instead to limit recovery
of punitive damages, Justice Campbell wrote an opinion reversing two judgments against the paper. In so doing, he ruled that
plaintiffs could not collect exemplary damages against newspapers unless they could scale the corporate ladder and show that
newspaper publishers themselves failed to take reasonable precautions to eliminate libelous stories by their employees.8 7 To
justify exemplary damages, he suggested, a plaintiff might show
that a paper failed to employ competent editors, that it exercised lax supervision over its reporters, or that its columns frequently contained libelous falsehoods." Such a doctrine, particularly if the burdens on plaintiffs were strictly applied, promised
the press considerable protection from large damage awards.
Thomas Cooley quickly incorporated the McArthur holding
into the first edition of Constitutional Limitations. After his
concession that case law did not support his suggestion that the
doctrine of conditional privilege be extended to a wide variety of
"newsworthy" stories, he offered the press the following consolation, citing McArthur as his sole authority:
The publisher of a newspaper, however, though responsi86. 16 Mich. 447 (1868). The first libel appeal heard by the court during Justice
Cooley's tenure involved a private letter. Edwards v. Chandler, 14 Mich. 471 (1866).
87. 16 Mich. 447, 455 (1868). The court held that the charge to the jury by the trial
judge was prejudicial to publishers of newspapers since it "left it in the power of the jury
to hold them in all respects identified with the faults of their agents." Id.

88. Id. at 554.
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ble for all the actual damage which a party may suffer in consequence of injurious publications in his paper, cannot properly be made liable for exemplary or vindictive damages, where
the article complained of was inserted in his paper without his
personal knowledge, and he has been guilty of no negligence in
the selection of agents, or of personal misconduct, and is not
shown habitually to make his paper the vehicle of detraction
and malice. 8'
But Justice Campbell's opinion in McArthur showed that
his views about the American press were closer to those of Chancellor Kent than to the sentiments expressed by Thomas Cooley.
The press was, Justice Campbell acknowledged, "one of the
necessities of civilization," and the laws which affected its operation "should not be unreasonable or vexatious." But "the reading public are not entitled to discussion in print upon the character or doing of private persons, except as developed in legal
tribunals or voluntarily subjected to public scrutiny." In Justice
Campbell's view, newspaper publishers owned a dangerous
weapon, and they owed the public a special duty "to reduce the
risk of having. . libels creep into their columns, to the lowest
degree which reasonable foresight can assure. ' 90 As he would
make clear in his later opinions, Justice Campbell believed that
maintenance of the rule of strict liability and rejection of the
doctrine of conditional privilege, even in political cases,
advanced the sound policy of reducing the publication of libels.
Although nearly ten years passed before the Michigan
Supreme Court heard another newspaper libel case, Justice Cooley ultimately had the chance to hear a number of libel appeals
between 1878 and 1884. Many of these involved James E.
Scripps, the publisher who brought "popular journalism" to
Michigan when he founded the Detroit Evening News in 1873.
During his earlier experiences with the Chicago and Detroit
Tribunes, Scripps revolted against the traditional large sheetsmall type format and the staid content of midwestern newspapers. Using the "penny press" of cities along the Atlantic seaboard as his model, Scripps offered a paper which was smaller in
size than the old "blanket" papers, yet one printed with large,
89. CONSTITTIONAL LImIrATIONS, supra note 9, at 457. At least one late nineteenth
century commentator on libel law saw the McArthur holding as a real victory for the
press. See Proffat, The Law of Newspaper Libel, 131 N. AM. REv. 109, 114 n.11 (1880).
90. 16 Mich. 447, 452 (1868).
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easy-to-read type;9 most important, he published a paper filled
with many brief stories. In Scripps' view, it was easy to distinguish a good newspaper from a mediocre journal: all one had to
do was to count the number of stories it contained."
James Scripps espoused essentially the same liberal marketplace views as Thomas Cooley. Both agreed that the successful
publisher had to satisfy the reader's demand for a journalistic
product that could capture the dynamic pace and the tremendous diversity of nineteenth-century America. To prosper, a
publisher also had to capture the interest of new readers while
maintaining that of former purchasers.9 3
Offering his Evening News at two cents, Scripps thought he
could appeal to Detroit's growing working class. Many
Detroiters, he believed, could not afford the city's other papers,
which sold at five cents, or digest their immense helpings of
political and financial doings. In his inaugural issue, Scripps
scolded the party newspapers for leaving a vast potential market
of readers untapped. Political papers, Scripps recognized, had
left the field of popular journalism entirely
unoccupied.... In my opinion there should be papers in
which only such things are published as are of interest to the
They will be useful to all clasgreat mass of their readers ....
Popuses who desire to keep up with the news of the day ....
larity and usefulness are our only aim: the wants of the great
public our only criterions in the choice of matter for our
columns."
Scripps initially found little support, particularly from
Detroit's financial community; in time, though, the Evening
News caught on, apparently with many people who previously
had not purchased papers." Scripps' style-generally called
91. W. LuTz, THE NEWS OF DETROrr 4-10 (1973). See A. BRIrr, ELLEN BROWNING
SCRIPPS (1961); I PROTEST! SELECTED DisQUISITONS OF E.W. SCRIPPS 28-33 (0. Knight ed.
1966). See generally E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 296-97 (1972).

92. Park, The Natural History of the Newspaper, 29 Am. J. Soc. 273, 284 (1923),
reprintedin R. PARK, ON SOCIAL CONTROL AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 97, 108 (R. Turner
ed. 1967).
93. By insisting that all the interests of news buyers, however trivial, should be
served, James Scripps emphasized the democratic implications of the marketplace of
ideas. See A. GOULDNER, supra note 45, at 121-22. Thomas Cooley found such a view of
the marketplace of ideas, particularly as it was implemented by James Scripps, unacceptable. See text accompanying notes 106-16, 154-62, 176-84 infra.
94. W. Lurz, supra note 91, at 9.
95. The working-class population of Detroit expanded, and despite the depression of
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"popular" or "personal" journalism-featured exposes about
supposedly respectable citizens who, the News claimed, actually
lived quite different lives and about political skullduggery in
high places. Not surprisingly, this journalism produced numerous threats of libel suits, particularly after James' youthful halfbrother, E. W. Scripps, became city editor in 1875. The eventual
founder of the huge Scripps newspaper chain, E. W. proudly
boasted that he gave his staff of reporters one basic order: "to
raise as much hell as possible.""
The Scripps' style of "hell" provided the Michigan Supreme
Court with several opportunities to clarify the broad theoretical
issues Thomas Cooley had raised in his treatises. It became evident that Justice James Campbell and Justice Cooley's other
colleagues had little sympathy for the defense of conditional
privilege in cases involving newspaper libels. In 1878, for example, Justice Campbell reversed a lower court judgment in favor
of the Evening News.' 7 The trial judge had clearly erred, he
ruled, when he ordered a directed verdict in favor of the News
and against a newspaper reporter who claimed that he had been
libeled in a story about police corruption. Despite the presumed
public interest in an account of police malfeasance, Justice
Campbell ruled that there was no possible ground for a conditional privilege.
The general public to whose entertainment or instruction all
newspapers are supposed to be devoted, has no concern
whatever with the lawful doings and affairs of private persons;
and all mention of them in print must be made under the private obligation of publishing no untruths to their prejudice and
the public obligation of saying nothing to their prejudice at all
unless upon adequate occasion.' 8
Justice Cooley silently concurred.
Although the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court
desired to impose strict liability for libelous falsehoods, the justices tried to reduce some of the danger when plaintiffs sought
punitive damages. In Scripps v. Reilly," the court overturned a
mid-1870's, the city's economy steadily expanded. M. HoLLi, DETROIT 54-59 (1976).
Thus, James Scripps found the demographic and economic bases for success, and his
type of journalism capitalized on the opportunities.
96. See I PROTEST!, supra note 91, at 32.
97. Tyron v. Evening News Ass'n, 39 Mich. 636 (1878).
98. Id. at 638.
99. 38 Mich. 10 (1878).
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$5,000 judgment in favor of a circuit court judge. 10 0 Writing for a
unanimous court, Justice Isaac Marston denounced the story,
which focused on the judge's marital problems, as a "sensational
and wholly unjustifiable article,"' 0 1 but he also rejected the trial
judge's instructions as insensitive to the problems of newspaper
publishers. "We must recognize," the court stated, that publishers sometimes rushed into print in order to give their readers
"the very latest and most reliable news" and "that on such occasions the same careful scrutiny cannot [be] exercised that would
at others."' 0 2 The need to get out the news quickly offered no
legal justification for libelous falsehoods, but it might be relevant to the amount of damages. In determining damages, the
court held that the jury should consider not only whether the
paper exercised "due care" under the particular circumstances,
but also "the character the paper had earned" by its earlier
issues. 103 Such a formula was intended to protect respectable
publishers "from such damages as a jury would be sure to inflict
upon those who are reckless and indifferent as to the right and
feelings of others, who hesitate not to publish scandalous matter" which served "no good or useful public purpose."'" A
paper's reputation and its publisher's motives were relevant
issues, and juries should receive evidence on both questions
before determining the amount of damages. 0 5 Once again, Justice Cooley concurred.
In Foster v. Scripps,'e a suit arising from an Evening News
story alleging that a physician had been criminally negligent in
100. The preceding year the court overturned a $4500 judgment because of procedural errors. Scripps v. Reilly, 35 Mich. 371 (1877).
101. The Evening News based its story, in part, upon the official divorce proceedings; in addition, however, it provided its own commentaries upon the affair. Scripps v.
Reilly, 38 Mich. at 17-18.
102. Id. at 27.
103. Id. at 27-29.
104. Id. at 29.
105. Id. at 28-29. Thus, Justice Marston made a distinction between articles published with "pure motives and with an earnest desire to give the public what" the writer
"considered an important item of news" and stories "published from impure and sordid
motives" which dragged reputations before the public in order "to pander to a depraved
appetite for scandal .....
"Id. at 27-28. Even if the libelous statements in the latter

type of article were true, he argued, the "bad motives" showed the kind of "recklessness
and want of due care" that would justify exemplary damages. Id. Although Justice Mar-

ston suggested this "bad motives" test as a means of determining damages and not civil
liability, the Michigan Supreme Court would eventually invoke an analogous test in
"public libel" cases. See text accompanying notes 154-57 infra.
106. 39 Mich. 376 (1878).
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vaccinating children, Justice Campbell rejected the contention
that the doctor's public position should render the story privileged. The supreme court overturned a directed verdict in favor
of James Scripps. 10 7 Although Justice Campbell disapproved of a
broad privilege for any type of political criticism, he argued that
the court could decide Scripps v. Foster on narrower grounds,
because the plaintiff occupied an appointive rather than an elective office, there was no possible basis for a privilege. Because
his colleague's dicta about privileged communications clashed so
loudly with treatise-writer Cooley's views, Justice Cooley issued
a concurring opinion asserting a broad conditional privilege but
concluding that Scripps had abused his privilege in this particular case.
To reach this result, Justice Cooley ignored most of the
ambiguous ideas presented in his treatises; instead, he adopted
an "ad hoc balancing" test. As he tacitly acknowledged, Cooley
had always grounded his general theory of public libel law upon
the "principled balancing" of a private individual's right to reputation and the public's interest in the free discussion of vital
issues.108 This obviously meant that "individuals whose charac1 9
ters or actions are impugned may suffer without remedy.''

0

Because the "plainest principles of justice" required courts to
grant such a privilege only "on reasonable grounds,"110 Cooley
urged judges to examine the nature and subject matter of
libelous publications. In most suits involving a claim of conditional privilege, courts would have no difficulty: the public's
interest would clearly outweigh the individual's right of reputation. Some publications, however, would carry a "bad tendency"
and courts would have to employ a second balancing test. This
second balancing should weigh the "public benefits of free discussion" against (1) the individual right of reputation and (2)
the potential "public evils" arising from the publication.'
Justice Cooley concluded that Foster v. Scripps required
two trips to the scales. Because the Evening News had published
the libel about an official who was not elected, he felt there had
been both an injury to private reputation and a serious public
107. Id. at 379-83.
108. On "principled" versus "ad hoc" balancing in a different, though analogous,
context, see Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALz L.J. 1424 (1962).
109. Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376, 383 (1878).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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injury. Certain appointed officials, Cooley now implied, did not
come within his marketplace principles. The public's confidence
"in an officer whose duties are such as to render confidence
extremely important to the continuous useful discharge of his
duties," Justice Cooley feared, had been "weakened or destroyed
unjustly when it ought to have been supported and strengthened. '112 This line of reasoning, which required judicial scrutiny
of the publication's supposed tendency, seemed a departure
from Cooley's general view, and he cautioned that "in assenting
to the conclusions of the court I confine my concurrence to the
exact case before us."11 8 Had the doctor been a candidate for
appointment rather than the incumbent city physician, he sug14 a policy posigested, his decision would have been different,
tion that seemed to imply that the public had more to fear from
an incompetent who wanted to become a city physician than
from one who already held the job.
Cooley's concurrence helped to clarify his position on libel
law and freedom of the press. It underscored Cooley's belief that
freedom of political expression was not absolute in scope:1 15 constitutional guarantees did not free citizens to say or write anything they pleased about political affairs. Also, Justice Cooley's
use of an ad hoc balancing test distinguished his theory of free
expression from those of twentieth century libertarians who
insist that once a publication falls within the category of protected expression, "no further consideration of its offensiveness
or potential harmfulness can be offered as a ground for opposing
its untrammeled performance." '
112. Id. at 383-84.
113. Id. at 384.
114. Id. Although Dr. Foster secured a judgment against Scripps at a second trial,
the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. Relying upon the doctrines set forth in the first
appeal, the court held that the trial judge improperly denied Scripps the right to introduce evidence to defeat a claim for exemplary damages. Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742,
746, 3 N.W. 216, 219 (1879).
115. For a discussion of the theory that the right of free expression is "absolute in
weight though limited in 'scope'," see Fuchs, Further Steps Toward a General Theory of
Freedom of Expression, 18 Wm. & MARY L. RE V. 347, 358 (1976). Relying in large part
upon the philosophical work of J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTIcE (1971) and R. DwORIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

(1977), Professor Fuchs suggests a theory that would prohibit

the kind of balancing used by Thomas Cooley in Scripps v. Foster. See note 116 infra.
116. Fuchs, supra note 115, at 358. Combining several approaches to free speech
questions, Professor Fuchs suggests that "freedom of expression can be given full protection unless it presents a clear and present threat to the equally protected rights of others
or to the total system of rights." Id. at 377. He would reject Justice Cooley's test, which
balanced the right of free expression against a potential "public evil," as too problemati-
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Despite its limitations when measured against some twentieth century theories, Justice Cooley's concurrence in Foster v.
Scripps foreshadowed his complete break with the rest of the
court in Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press."7 Again, the Michigan
Supreme Court reversed a verdict for the press and sent back for
retrial a suit by an attorney who represented a member of the
Detroit Board of Trade. The Free Press story had alleged various fraudulent activities by both the plaintiff and his client.
Atkinson employed at least four other lawyers who raised no less
than forty-one assignments of error on evidentiary questions
alone.11 8 In addition to attempting to unravel all of these claims,
Justice Campbell considered the qualified privilege issue. Predictably, he held that the article was not "connected with any
matter concerning which it could be regarded as privileged,"' 1 9
only proof of truth would suffice as a defense.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Cooley issued his most famous
judicial statement on behalf of free expression. After tilting with
his colleagues on some evidentiary issues, he declared that their
whole theory of the case was "radically erroneous." The story
and the Atkinson case did not involve "only private considerations," but also raised public issues in which "all consideration
of mere technical accuracy become irrelevant."' 2 0 The law must
extend a qualified privilege to such a story, he argued, because
of the public interest in Detroit's commercial health which
depended, in large part, upon the honesty of members of the
Board of Trade. Thus he urged the court to treat stories about
quasi-public institutions the same as those about governmental
institutions and public officials."'
Although Justice Cooley never raised the issue of balancing
cal and speculative. Id. at 371-73, 376.
117. 46 Mich. 341, 9 N.W. 501 (1881). Although Cooley issued a ringing dissent in
this case, two years earlier he had silently concurred as Justice Campbell denied any
privilege for a story about a candidate for Congress. Baily v. Kalamazoo Publishing Co.,
40 Mich. 251 (1879). Perhaps he let Justice Campbell's position go unchallenged because
it was dictum, the court having reversed a judgment in favor of the publisher on other
grounds. Id. at 257.
118. Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press Co., 46 Mich. 341, 367-68, 9 N.W. 501, 515
(1881).
119. Id. at 349, 9 N.W. at 505.
120. Id. at 375-76, 9 N.W. at 520 (Cooley, J., dissenting).
121. "It is as important to the city of Detroit that it should have an honorable and
trustworthy board of trade. . . as it is that it should have trustworthy mayor or controller, or police authorities or other public functionaries." Id. at 381, 9 N.W. at 523 (Cooley,
J., dissenting).
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public benefits against public evils, he apparently thought the
story, though intemperate, carried no "bad tendency." The
newspaper had a duty to investigate and report rumors of
wrongdoing by members of the board and to report its findings,
particularly to readers from the business community. The Free
Press "would have been unworthy of the confidence and support
of commercial men if its conductors had shut their eyes to such
a transaction."12 2 The paper "might have used more carefullyguarded language, and avoided irritating headlines," but Justice
Cooley excused such indiscretions as "honest indignation."12' 8 He
appeared, then, to endorse rough-and-tumble political journalism as inseparable from a system of free expression." 4 Even if
the plaintiff were wholly innocent, Justice Cooley argued, "it was
his misfortune that it was impossible to deal with the case without bringing him into the discussion."'12 8 Cooley concluded that
the circumstances of the Atkinson case demanded that the story
be protected. "If such a discussion of a matter of public interest
were prima facie an unlawful act, and the author were obliged to
justify every statement by evidence of its literal truth, the liberty of public discussion would be unworthy of being named as a
privilege of value.' 26 The principled balancing inherent in Cooley's view of conditional privilege had already occurred.
Justice Cooley believed his dissent announced a wise public
policy that stood on firm legal and constitutional grounds. He
thought the majority opinion departed from common law traditions of liberty and constitutional guarantees of free speech. "In
what I say in this case I advance no new doctrines, but justify
every statement of principle upon approved authorities."'" 27 Cooley noted that Justice Campbell cited many cases "from which a
different argument may be constructed," but these precedents
were "no longer deserving of credit if they ever were.' 1 28 Regrettably, Justice Cooley suggested, the privilege of discussing issues
122. Id. at 383, 9 N.W. at 523 (Cooley, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 382, 9 N.W. at 523 (Cooley, J., dissenting).
124. [All of] the beneficial ends to be subserved by public discussion would in
large measure be defeated if dishonesty must be handled with delicacy and
fraud spoken of with such circumspection and careful and deferential choice of
words as to make it appear in the discussion a matter of indifference.
Id. (Cooley, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 383, 9 N.W. at 523 (Cooley, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 383, 9 N.W. at 524 (Cooley, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 384, 9 N.W. at 524 (Cooley, J., dissenting).
128. Id.

19801

Thomas M. Cooley

of public interest had never received enough recognition in the
courts. "Perhaps the privilege would have seemed to stand out
more boldly and appeared more sacred if the provisions deliberately incorporated for its protection and perpetuation in every
American constitution had been collated and given prominence.
M But although his ideas might seem a novel interpretation of state constitutional guarantees, he concluded, they still
had support in the common law. Defenders of free expression
could find the privilege of public discussion "embodied in the
good sense of the common law, where it has constituted one of
the most important elements in the beneficent growth and progress of free States."1 3 0
The following year, Justice Cooley briefly received support
from a majority of the court for his views on free expression. In
Miner v. Detroit Post & Tribune Co.,1' 3 the paper accused the
plaintiff, a police judge, of several violations of judicial ethics.
The paper's attorneys did not attempt to prove the truth of the
charges and argued instead that the article "related to matters
of public interest and importance, and was for that reason privileged.' 132 The trial court accepted the claim of privilege for the
paper's charge that the judge failed to enforce liquor and gambling laws, but it rejected any privilege for allegations that he
falsely imprisoned "a Chinaman." The trial judge held that a
newspaper could claim a privilege for general expressions of
opinion about the actions of public officials-what most American courts would eventually accept as the right of "fair comment"- but not for specific charges of "an act nearly amounting
'
to a crime" or imputations of "specific moral delinquency."'
4
For libelous statements of fact, only truth would be a defense.'
The jury found for the plaintiff, but the supreme court overturned the judgment. Justice Cooley felt that the trial judge had
erred by permitting portions of the story that he had declared
privileged "to be made the subject of comment [by the plaintiff's
attorney] to the prejudice of the defendant."3 But Cooley fur129. Id. at 385, 9 N.W. at 525 (Cooley, J., dissenting).

130. Id.
131. 49 Mich. 358, 13 N.W. at 773 (1882).
132. Id. at 361, 13 N.W. at 774.
133. Id. at 361-62, 13 N.W. at 773. On the development of the defense of fair comment, see works cited in note 78 supra.
134. Miner v. Detroit Post & Tribune Co., 49 Mich. 358, 362, 13 N.W. 773, 774-75
(1882).
135. Id. at 362. 13 N.W. at 774.
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ther argued that a qualified privilege attached to the entire
story, rather than only to the portions about liquor and gambling. "A much more serious and more dangerous error," stated
Cooley, "is found in that part of the article which concerned the
proceedings in the case of the Chinaman. '"16
Relying upon his lengthy dissent in Atkinson, Justice Cooley only briefly discussed the conditional privilege issue in
Miner.1 37 The trial judge, Cooley bristled, erroneously "put the
case upon precisely the same footing with publications which
involved merely private gossip and scandal."1 3 8 A story about
alleged judicial corruption clearly involved the public interest. " '
The Post, then, properly exercised its duty "to challenge public
attention to the official disregard of the principles which protect
public and personal liberty." 4 0 The theory of the trial court and
of a dissent by Justice Campbell-that there was no privilege for
libelous misstatements of fact-was valid only if there were "no
difference in moral quality between the publication of mere personal abuse and matters of grave public concern. 1 4 1 The common law, Justice Cooley concluded, could never justify such an
absurd conclusion. To do so would place "the reckless libeler
. . . in the same company with respectable and public spirited
136. Id. at 363, 13 N.W. at 775.
137. Id. at 363-64, 13 N.W. at 775-76.
138. Id. at 364, 13 N.W. at 775-76.
139. When a judge orders a man into confinement without a charge against
him, he deprives him of liberty without due process of law; and in doing so
violates the earliest and most important guaranty of constitutional freedom .... There must be some great and most serious defect in the administration of the law when such things can take place, and the matter is one which
concerns every member of the political community ...
Id. at 363-64, 13 N.W. at 775.
140. Id. at 364, 13 N.W. at 776.
141. Id. In a sharp dissent, Justice Campbell argued that although there should be
"the amplest right to draw inferences from facts," there could be no justification "when
the facts themselves are wanting ... " Id. at 366, 13 N.W. at 776 (Campbell, J., dissenting). He was satisfied that the interests of the press had been safeguarded adequately
because the trial judge had directed the jury "to confine damages to actual damages in
case they were satisfied the publication was made in good faith and on reasonable
grounds of belief." Id. at 365, 13 N.W. at 776. "The line is clearly drawn," he argued,
"between false assertions and false deductions." Id. at 366, 13 N.W. at 777. False assertions of fact, he concluded, deserved no legal protection. This was "the only doctrine
under which the reputation of citizens can be preserved from assaults. Good faith diminishes the injury, and in many cases may reduce damages to a minimum, but it is impossible to hold that it entirely destroys the damages, and in civil cases such is not the
accepted law." Id.

Thomas M. Cooley

1980]

journalists."'' Justice Cooley's opinion in Miner reiterated his
earlier break with neo-Blackstonian libel doctrines and his conviction that even the defense of "fair comment" restricted free
discussion too tightly. Nonetheless, his majority opinion in
Miner also made it clear that he was not prepared to tolerate all

libelous falsehoods.
Cooley now emphasized that his ideas on libel did more
than protect freedom of the press; they also helped to isolate
journalistic renegades and to place them under proper legal
restraints' 4
Only carefully-crafted libel doctrines that
attempted to distinguish between stories in the public interest
and sensationalist accounts that pandered to popular
tastes-doctrines that separated legitimate journalists from gossip-mongers--could gain enough public support to provide effective restraints. Cooley still endorsed libel laws that did not discourage discussion of "legitimate" public issues; but it was
becoming clear that he would focus more upon the character of

the publication, and the supposed motives behind its appearance, and less upon the more objective circumstances that preceded the decision to publish libelous items that later proved to

be false.144

142. Id. at 365, 13 N.W. at 776.
143. I know of nothing more likely to encourage the license of a dissolute press
than to establish the principle that the discussion of matters of general concern involving public wrongs and the publication of personal scandal come
under the same condemnation in the law; for this inevitably brings the law into
contempt and creates public sentiment against its enforcement. If a law is to
be efficiently enforced the approval of the people must attend its penalties,
and there must be some presumption at least that an act which its [sic] punishes involves some elements of wrong-doing.
Id. at 364-65, 13 N.W. at 776.
144. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has dealt with such an inquiry into
the journalist's state of mind while he or she was formulating and writing a libelous
story. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Thomas Cooley seemed to suggest the
appropriateness of such a test in his critique of early nineteenth century libel cases from

New York.

CONSTrrTTIONAL LIMrrATioNs,

supra note 9, at 438-39. In another work, he

indicated that the doctrine of qualified privilege allowed a person to publish "what he
believes" and only required that "the occasion of the publications be such as to justify if
true." GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 41, at 279. In the Herbert case, even the dissenters viewed such an inquiry, under the discovery process, as the logical extension of the
"actual malice" test. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 192-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting). On the other hand, Chief Justice Kaufman of
the Circuit Court of Appeals condemned such inquiries because of their "chilling effect"
on free expression. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir. 1977). Not surprisingly,
most journalists have agreed with Chief Justice Kaufman's view. See, e.g., EIOR &
PUBLISHER, April 28, 1979, at 12; id., May 5, 1979, at 24. In the late nineteenth century,
journalists would have welcomed such inquiries while judges such as James Campbell
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A year later, Justice Cooley underscored his belief that
courts should attempt to assess the motives of newspaper publishers. In Bathrick v. Detroit Post & Tribune Co.,"1 5 the court
upheld a decision against the Post. The paper reported the
indictment of a physician charged with seducing a young
patient, having sexual relations with her, and performing a criminal abortion. The court found several errors in the lower court
proceedings and sent the case back for retrial. But, significantly,
Justice Cooley also rejected the defendant's challenge to the
trial judge's interpretation of the doctrine of privileged publications. The article-a typical example of crime reporting by late
nineteenth century urban newspapers-did not pretend to be "a
mere recital of the proceedings which had taken place in a court
of justice," complained Justice Cooley. The newspaper writer
had brought in other facts and "assumed himself to be the
judge, and to pronounce guilt and suggest a probable punishment unknown to law."146 There could be no privilege for such a
sensationalized story.
Cooley's judicial experience soon found its way into the fifth
edition of Constitutional Limitations.1 4 7 In revising his discussion of libel law and the press, Cooley drew upon the Atkinson
and Miner cases. Cautioning readers that the libertarian opinion
in Atkinson (the author of which he modestly left unidentified)
represented only dictum, he devoted one footnote, nearly four
pages of the new edition, to his dissent." 8 He suggested that the
press should enjoy a qualified privilege for stories that discussed
"matters of government in all its grades and all its branches,"
the "performances of official duty by all classes of public officers
and agents," and "all means of transportation and carriage, even
when in private hands and management."14 9 And, he went on,
this privilege should also extend to discussions of "all schemes,
projects, enterprises and organizations of a semi-public nature,
opposed them. See, e.g., MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 241-42, 17 N.W. 815, 816-17
(1883) (Sherwood, J., dissenting) (conflict over the inquiry into James Scripps' "state of
mind").
145. 50 Mich. 629, 16 N.W. 172 (1883).
146. Id. at 644, 16 N.W. at 179.
147. Cooley finished the preface to the Fifth Edition in February, 1883, and the

work was published later that year: T.

COOLEY,

A TREATISE

ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMI-

TATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERIcAN

UNION

(5th ed. 1883) [hereinafter cited as

148. Id. at 563-66 n.1.
149. Id. at 562.

CoNsTrrrUrIoNAL LIMITATIONS

(5th ed.)].
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which invite the public favor, and depend for their success on
public confidence," including the activities of banks, insurance
companies, private asylums, and public fairs. 150
In contrast to his earlier musings, though, Cooley now
emphasized that such a privilege implied no special legal status
for the press. In fact, he categorically denied that the institutional press possessed any special legal protection under the
common law. "The publisher of a newspaper," he concluded,
could freely open his columns to sharp, critical examinations "so
long as they are restricted within the limits of good faith, not
because he makes the furnishing of news his business, but
because the discussion is the common right and liberty of every
151
citizen. ,
Finally, the fifth edition of Constitutional Limitations
underscored Cooley's policy argument in Miner: libel doctrines
that protected "good faith" criticism actually helped to differentiate significant journalistic pieces from trivial ones; they distinguished information the sovereign people needed to know to act
as intelligent citizens from items they merely wished to discover
in order to satisfy their curiosity. Thus, Cooley drew a sharp distinction between "the mere publication of items of news in
which the public may take an interest as news merely, and the
discussion of matters which concern the public because they are
their own affairs." 15' Moreover, he clearly distinguished between
libelous stories involving "public characters" and those dealing
with "private individual(s)." In Cooley's view, a "private individual only challenges public criticism when his conduct
becomes or threatens to be injurious to others; public characters
and public institutions invite it at all times."' 5 3
150. Id.
151. Id. at 563.
152. Id. at 562. Here, Cooley's views on freedom of expression appear close to those
of Alexander Meiklejohn. See A.

MEIKLEJOHN,

POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL

(1960); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REv. 245. "What a wonderful faith Meiklejohn must have had in human abilities," observed Dean Wellington, "if he believed that any person could draw the publicprivate line sharply and clearly." Wellington, supra note 45, at 1111. See also Silver,
Essay: Libel, the "Higher Truths" of Art and the First Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REv.
1065, 1073-74 (1978). Although some slight nuances separate the marketplace and the
Meiklejohn approaches, the two are very similar. See L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577 (1978).
153. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (5th ed.), supra note 147, at 562. Cooley's effort
here to distinguish between "public" and "private" persons resembles the more recent
attempts of the United States Supreme Court to accomplish the same task. The more
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
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In 1883, Justice Cooley and his colleagues heard MacLean v.
Scripps,'" a case involving a member of the faculty at the University of Michigan School of Medicine and, once again, James
Scripps. The Evening News had carried a story alleging that the
doctor had taken sexual liberties with one of his patients, and
the physician-professor successfully sued for damages. With only
one justice dissenting, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the
award. Most of the issues before the supreme court concerned
the trial judge's refusal to allow Scripps and his managing editor
to testify as to the absence of "malice." The judge had rejected
their testimony on this point, and Justice Campbell, with Cooley's support, affirmed the ruling. Campbell invoked a "good
motives" test, which he borrowed from Michigan's constitutional
provision on criminal libel, against Scripps and the Evening
News. According to Justice Campbell, the constitutional language, which provided that in criminal libel cases truth was a
justification only if published with "good motives" and for "justifiable ends,"15 5 was "only another form of saying that malicious
publications are not privileged from criminal prosecution, even
if true."15 6 Thus, in civil libel suits, he ingeniously argued, there
should be no analogous privilege for falsehoods if publishers
lacked "good motives." The theory that "a person may publish
falsehoods of another who occupies a position in which his conduct is open to public scrutiny and criticism, without any reference to the object to be secured by the publication, is a doctrine
'167
which has no foundation that we have been able to discover.
In short, a newspaper could invoke the defense of privilege in
civil suits only if the motives behind libelous stories could pass
recent effort has been even more difficult because the court has attempted not only to
distinguish between "private" and "public" persons but between "all purpose" and "limited purpose" public persons as well. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 35152 (1964) (prominent attorney and author not a public figure); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976) (prominent socialite not a public figure); Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166-68 (1979) (nephew of admitted Soviet spy not a public
figure). In the first edition of CONsTrrTmONAL LIMrrATONs and in his Atkinson dissent,
Cooley had recognized, at least implicitly, that it was difficult, if not irrational, to insist
upon sharp distinctions between the "public" and the "private" spheres. See Atkinson v.
Detroit Free Press, 46 Mich. 341, 383, 9 N.W. 501, 523 (1881) (Cooley, J., dissenting);
CONsTrruTiONAL LIMrrATONS, supra note 9, at 440, 454.

154. 52 Mich. 214, 17 N.W. 815 (1883). The plaintiff was a colleague of Justices
Campbell and Cooley at the University of Michigan.
155. MICH. CONS'1. of 1850, art. VI, § 25.
156. MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 221, 17 N.W. 815, 817 (1883) (emphasis
added).
157. Id. at 220, 17 N.W. at 817.
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judicial scrutiny.
Justice Campbell's new construction of Michigan's libel law
produced a sharp dissent relying heavily on Cooley's earlier dissent in the Atkinson case. s A story alleging immoral and
unethical conduct by a professor at the state university, the dissent maintained, raised important public issues, and testimony
from Scripps was relevant to the issues of "malice" and conditional privilege. 159
The charge concerned a public man in a high public position,
in charge of most important public interests; those in which all
the people were interested. He was a public servant, paid from
the public funds; and the article concerns his conduct while in
that service . . . and I think the article was privileged within
the law as expounded by this Court.1
"Certainly it must be so," the dissent pointedly added, "if
charges Of alleged fraud against a member of a board of trade is
within the protection, as held . . . in Atkinson v. Detroit Free
Press . . . in which opinion upon this subject I fully concur." 61
Despite the strong endorsement of Cooley's opinion in
Atkinson, this dissent was not written by Thomas Cooley but by
Justice Thomas Sherwood. " Justice Cooley not only concurred
in Justice Campbell's majority opinion, but he stated his own
position when Scripps petitioned for a rehearing.'
"No court
has gone further than has this in upholding the privileges of the
press, and very few so far," Justice Cooley boasted.' 6 The court
would promptly rectify any violation of free expression, but
there had been none. The need for evidence of malice had been
satisfied by "proofs from which the jury might infer that the
publication was made in entire disregard of the plaintiff's rights,
'"
and from interested motives. 5
In MacLean v. Scripps, then, Cooley announced yet another
158. Id. at 223-50, 17 N.W. at 818-33.
159. Id. at 241-42, 17 N.W. at 828 (Sherwood, J., dissenting). On this point, the
dissent relied upon Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742, 746, 3 N.W. 216, 218 (1879). See note
114, supra.
160. MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 244, 17 N.W. 815, 827 (1883) (Sherwood, J.,
dissenting).
161. Id., 17 N.W. at 829.
162. Justice Sherwood became a member of court in April, 1883.
163. The petition was denied, and Justice Cooley authored the court's opinion.
MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 18 N.W. 209 (1884).
164. Id. at 253, 18 N.W. at 210.
165. Id.
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definition of "malice." Apparently, the publication of libelous
falsehoods with a reckless disregard of a plaintiff's reputation-with "entire disregard" for his rights-might constitute
legal malice. But without a doubt, evidence of "bad motives," in
the form of sensationalism and search for monetary gain, could
satisfy Cooley's definition of malice. Thus, for Cooley, courts
need not even probe a journalist's "state of mind" in order to
find whether or not there had been an "entire disregard" for the
right of reputation. Rather, a false and injurious publication
made in a public journal for sensation and increase of circulation, Cooley ruled, "is unquestionably in a legal sense malicious. ' ' e6 Justice Cooley's efforts to realign Michigan's libel laws,
when judged even by his own standards, ended in failure. Chaotically mixing rulebounded jurisprudence and ad hoc balancing,
Cooley produced neither doctrinal clarity nor consistent judicial
policy-making.

III
Viewed from a narrowly legalistic perspective, one could
argue that Cooley's position in Bathrick and MacLean did not
really clash with a strict reading of his earlier ambiguous constructions of the law of conditional privilege. In his Treatise on
the Law of Torts, Cooley had denied any protection for publica166. Id. The theory that "actual malice" meant "reckless disregard" for the truth or
falsehood of libelous statements, the view ascribed to by the United States Supreme
Court in New York Times and its progeny, proposed a fairly objective test that presumably focused upon the manner in which publishers went about investigating, verifying,
and preparing stories that contained allegedly defamatory falsehoods. See notes 76 & 144
supra. On the other hand, since 1974, a majority of the United States Supreme Court
has used a theory that is closer to the dictionary definition of "malice"-i.e. "ill-will."
See the pointed discussion of Justice Potter Stewart, distinguishing between the two theories of "malice" in constitutionally-protected cases and suggesting the pitfalls inherent
in the very term "malice." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199-202 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
As a treatise-writer, Thomas Cooley rejected the idea that "legal malice" equaled
"ill-will" or had anything to do with the supposed motives of publishers. The term itself
was inherently misleading, Cooley conceded, but he argued that "in a legal sense" it
could "only mean that the false and injurious publication had been made without legal
excuse." TORTS, supra note 9, at 209. In addition, he asserted that the law must ignore
the motives of publishers in determining the malice element: "it is the protection of the
party injured the law aims at, not the punishment of bad motives instigating bad action
in the party injuring him." Id. In MacLean, however, Justice Cooley merged the two very
different conceptions of "malice." "Malice" could be the result of an "entire disregard"
for the plaintiff's reputation or the result of a publisher's "bad motives." For further
analysis of Justice Cooley's changing position, see text accompanying notes 167-96 infra.
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tions that went beyond the record of judicial proceedings, 7 and
Bathrick can be read as merely reinforcing that view. Similarly,
one can reconcile Cooley's invocation of a "good motives" test in
MacLean with his caveat in Miner and with a narrow reading of
his treatises. Even in Constitutional Limitations he suggested
that courts and jurors might take into account "the nature of
the charges made and the reasons which existed for making
them" in determining whether the conditional privilege had
been exceeded.16 8 In addition, Cooley's position in MacLean,
that the motives of the publisher could indicate legal malice, followed a view of libel law proposed nearly a half-century earlier
in State v. Burnham' 6 -an influential American opinion on
privileged publications by Justice Joel Parker of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. Although Justice Parker's ambitious
attempt to revise the American law of libel lacked clarity, it was
unequivocal on one point: courts should grant no protection for
libelous political falsehoods that stemmed from "bad
0
motives.

' '17

In another sense, though, the opinions in Bathrick and
MacLean indicated that Cooley was gradually adopting a new
approach to the conflict between libel law and the constitutional
guarantees of free expression. In contrast to his dissent in
Atkinson and his more cautious majority opinion in Miner, for
instance, Cooley was unwilling to adopt a broad, instrumentalist
interpretation of precedents. Moreover, as the additions to ConstitutionalLimitations suggest, he seemed to express a new hostility toward at least some segments of the press and a new caution about granting publishers like James Scripps the benefit of
the doubt-or the privileges of the law-in libel cases.
Thus, Justice Cooley's later libel opinions offered his judicial response to developments in urban journalism and in the
general system of public communication. Cooley had written the
first edition of Constitutional Limitations in the days when
167. ToRTs, supra note 9, at 218-19.
168. See Miner v. Detroit Post & Tribune Co., 49 Mich. 358, 364-65, 13 N.W. 773,
776 (1882); CoNsTrruTroNAL LIMIrrATIONS, supra note 9, at 440. See also id. at 454 (where
Cooley supported the reasoning of Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill 513 (N.Y. 1842), in those
cases "where private character is dragged before the public. - . to pander to a depraved
appetite for scandal .... ").
169. 9 N.H. 34 (1837). Justice Parker was one of the foremost jurists of the antebellum era. For sketches of his career, see 14 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 230-31
(1934); P. PALUDAN, supra note 3, at 109-24.

170. State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 45 (1837).
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"popular journalism" had spread to only a few cities and when
the system of centrally-directed party presses remained largely
intact. By the mid-1880s, all this had changed. Flexing the
power that came with rising circulation figures, and rising advertising revenues, a new generation of urban journalists began to
experiment with the kind of political reporting Theodore
Roosevelt would later call "muckraking." Breaking free from
party organizations, they set their own courses, mounting bombastic crusades on behalf of "ordinary citizens," their own consumer group and against public "corrupters," whatever their
political affiliation or official position. At the same time, publishers expanded "human interest" reporting-begun by the "penny
presses" of the 1830s-and featured stories about illicit and
immoral activities by all kinds of people and highlighted exposes
1 71
of those who travelled in high society.
In short, urban publishers, like the Scripps brothers were
aggressively marketing "news," a highly profitable commodity.
The business of "news" clashed with many of the assumptions
underlying the liberal faith in the marketplace of ideas.
Although the claim that late nineteenth-century journalists were
in the business of "news-making," rather than "news-gathering, 'n72 might have been a bit harsh, Cooley's view that journalists merely responded to the "demand" that they supply "a complete summary of the events transpiring in the world" erred in
the other direction. 178 As Justice Cooley came to recognize in
suits involving the Detroit Evening News, popular journalists
employed a variety of techniques to "discover" items of interest
to their readers, to shape this material into74 "news," and to market the final product to a mass audience.1
171. On the decline of centrally-directed party presses, see C. SMrrH, THE PRESS,

passim (1977). On the changes in late nineteenth century journalism, see E. EMERY, supra note 91, at 307-410; G. JUERGENS, JOSEPH PULrr ER AND THE
NEW YORK WORLD 50-92 (1966); M. SCHUDSON, supra note 43, at 61-106; B. WEISBERGER,
POLITICS AND PATRONAGE

supra note 43, at 121-55.
172. See D. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE 181-261 (1962).
173. CONSTITUTIONAL LIrrATIONS, supra note 9, at 452.
174. For a suggestive analysis of journalism as a manufactured commodity, see
Carey, Journalismand Criticism: The Case of an Undeveloped Profession, 36 REv. POL.
227 (1974):
Journalism is not only literary art; it is industrial art. The inverted pyramid,
the 5 W's lead, and associated techniques are as much a product of industrialization as tin cans. The methods, procedures and canons of journalism were
developed not only to satisfy the demands of the profession but to meet the
needs of industry to turn out a mass-produced commodity.
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With the rise of large-scale corporate publishing and the
invention of "mass-mediated news," 1 5 Cooley's old liberal faith
that private channels of mass communication could offer neutral
conduits for the free exchange of ideas and information began to
fade. In urban areas, corporate publishers were not part of an
open forum in which buyers and sellers could exchange ideas
and information to the ultimate benefit, and the greater enlightenment, of all. Even worse, the bombastic stories of James and
E. W. Scripps seemed more likely to produce social conflict than
social cohesion. For Thomas Cooley, these new developments
revealed some fundamental difficulties with his earlier views
about libel and freedom of expression, ideas which drew heavily
upon his larger vision of marketplace liberalism.
Thomas Cooley shared the common liberal faith that the
economic, political, and intellectual marketplaces operated in
conjunction with yet a fourth marketplace-a moral one. Indeed,
one of the basic justifications for the liberal devotion to all of
these marketplaces was the claim that they allowed good and
honest people (as well as good and honest ideas) to prevail. In
all of these liberal marketplaces, the best products, the best people, and the best ideas supposedly reached the "front shelves"
on their intrinsic merits rather than because of some artificial
and often governmentally-conferred advantage. Conversely, the
self-regulating mechanisms of the marketplace caused evil and
dishonest schemers to stay in the background. In a truly free
marketplace, all types of "rotten apples," both people and ideas,
would be left to wither and decay on the "back shelves. ' 17 6
In his treatises, Cooley confidently combined the various
marketplaces. He invoked the moral marketplace along with the
intellectual, insisting that a qualified privilege could apply to
libelous stories about even the private lives of public people.
The notion, he argued indignantly, "that a judge who is corrupt
and debauched in private life may be pure and upright in his
judgments" was "false to human nature," and "contradictory to
general experience." 177 The idea, of course, was also "false" and
"contradictory" to the liberal faith that, in the race for success
Id. at 246. See also M. SCHUDSON, supra note 43, at 61-106. 175. See generally, M. REAL, MASS-MEDIATED CULTURE (1977).
176. On the moral marketplace, see G. WILLs, supra note 8,at 15-177. As Professor
Frakt has noted, the Burger court also has applied the test of the moral marketplace in
some of its recent free speech decisions. Frakt, supra note 6, at 530 n.69.
177. CONsTrruToNAL LiIrrTONS, supra note 9, at 440.
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in business or in politics, victory went to not only the swiftest

and sharpest but also the "best." A liberalized intellectual marketplace, in other words, would help to ensure proper functioning of the moral realm.
Cooley, the quintessential nineteenth-century liberal, made
no secret of his belief that his judicial decisions were consistent
with his view of the proper settlement of competing moral
issues.17 8 Dissenting in Atkinson, Cooley left no doubt that he
considered the conduct of the plaintiff, an attorney, and of his
client-friend, a member of Detroit's Board of Trade, morally and
ethically reprehensible. To "any disinterested business man,"
Cooley argued, the machinations of the attorney and the official
"would have been suspicious." As Cooley recited the "facts," he
observed that no honest attorney could "undertake to justify
[iln morals.'' 1 In Miner, he was equally
such conduct. ...
forthright in denouncing as immoral and unethical the conduct
of another member of the legal profession-a police judge in
Detroit. In Cooley's view, the morals of a judge, like those of
Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. "When a judge orders a
man into confinement with a charge against him ....

[t]here

must be some great and most serious defect in the administration of the law. .

.

.

"1s0

And, he concluded, any legal theory

that did not provide some protection for stories revealing allegations of judicial misconduct ignored the "moral" quality of such
journalism. 181

Although in Miner, Cooley praised the "respectable and
in Bathrick, and especially in
public spirited" journalist,'
MacLean, Cooley obviously found the moral scales tilting
against the press. In MacLean, Cooley was uninterested in testimony about the defendants' "state[s] of mind." From the content and tone of the story, Cooley confidently concluded that the
motives of the Evening News had been immoral, and therefore,
178. See text accompanying notes 106-16 supra. Cooley seemed especially troubled
when libels touched the reputations of physicians. The cases in which he took his hardest
line against the press-Foster, Bathrick, and MacLean-all involved lawsuits by
physicians.
179. Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press Co., 46 Mich. 341, 381, 9 N.W. 501, 522-23
(1881).
180. Miner v. Detroit Post & Tribune Co., 49 Mich. 358, 363-64, 13 N.W. 773, 775
(1882).
181. Id. at 364, 13 N.W. at 776.
182. Id. at 365, 13 N.W. at 776.
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constituted "legal malice."'

8

Cooley was not content to rest his

finding of liability on the fact that Scripps' paper had exceeded
its qualified privilege by publishing a libelous falsehood with
"entire disregard" for the rights of the plaintiff. By seeking to
peddle sensationalist stories, and thereby to increase the sales
and profits of his paper, James Scripps threatened the fundamental principles of the moral marketplace. To allow such stories to escape legal liability, simply because they touched the
reading public's fancy, would subvert Cooley's view of the benefits to be gained from the moral marketplace.
The sanctity of the moral marketplace was particularly
important to people like Thomas Cooley. As the historian Burton J. Bledstein has argued, the new middle-class professionals
who came into prominence and power during the mid-Victorian
era placed great importance on their reputations-both personal
and professional. To these professionals, success, and the esteem
that followed, represented measures of individual moral worth,
of personal as well as professional qualities. Moreover, the mechanisms of the moral marketplace did not operate simply to
aggrandize members of the new professions. Professionals passionately argued that their own ascending careers-be they in
law, medicine, or some other area-also advanced the general
public interest, especially when professionals offered their private talents to public service. Those who would wrongfully tear
down the reputations of professionals, as did James Scripps,
were attacking the whole mechanism of middle-class mobility
and national growth.'"
Thomas Cooley was not alone in his doubts about the direction of urban journalism. 88 The oft-lamented problem of "irresponsible" journalism produced numerous demands for new
legal controls-the most famous and successful innovation was,
of course, Samuel Warren's and Louis B. Brandeis' call for a new
right of privacy'lS-but most immediate legal response came in
183. MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 251, 253, 18 N.W. 209, 210 (1884) (motion for
rehearing).

184. See B.

BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM

65-79 (1976); Godkin,

The Rights of the Citizen, 8 ScRmIR's MAGAZINE 58-67 (1890).
185. See L. HAUSMAN, CRICISM OF THE PRESS IN U.S. PERIODICALS, 1900-1939 (Journalism Monographs No. 4, 1967).
186. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). See
Adams, The Right of Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L. REv. 37
(1905); Speed, The Right of Privacy, 163 N. AM. REv. 74 (1896). For a historical treatment, see Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REv.1 (1979). One
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the form of more libel suits against the press. Lawyers and journalists of the late nineteenth century, as well as later historians,
have noted the rising number of defamation cases, particularly
187
those involving political figures.
At the same time, critics of the press called for retention of
traditional libel doctrines. During the 1880s and 1890s, for
example, both legal journals and general periodicals contained
numerous articles demanding that courts retain or strengthen
neo-Blackstonian rules. By the first decade of the twentieth century, most legal commentators and the vast majority of courts
rejected anything resembling Thomas Cooley's view of conditional privilege. In all but a few states, the courts imposed strict
liability for most libelous falsehoods and denied the press any
general privilege for publications involving public officials or stories of "public interest. ' 8" This trend toward increased regulation of the intellectual marketplace, of course, paralleled a similar retreat from the doctrines of classical economic liberalism in
favor of new theories justifying increased governmental involvement in the marketplace. 18 '
The third edition of Cooley's Treatise on the Law of Torts,
which appeared in 1906 (eight years after the author's death),
graphically illustrated the general repudiation of mid-nineteenth
century libertarianism. To Cooley's original statement that constitutional guarantees of free expression required both freedom
from prior restraints and exemption from liability for non-malicious political falsehoods, the editor of the new edition, John
Lewis, added a significant qualification: "But a candidate for
of the authorities Warren and Brandeis could cite was none other than Thomas Cooley.
See TORTS, supra note 9, at 290.

187. See Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 1155-56.
188. Id. at 1157-59. In the case of libel suits involving public officials and candidates, the doctrine imposing strict liability for libelous falsehoods became known as the
"majority rule." See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates,49 COLUM. L.
Rav. 875 (1949). Despite Cooley's dissent in Atkinson and his opinion in Miner, Michigan eventually embraced the majority rather than the minority rule. See Belknap v. Ball,
83 Mich. 583, 47 N.W. 674 (1890). A few jurisdictions adopted positions similar to Cooley's-doctrines which were collectively known as "the minority rule." The leading statement of the "minority rule" came in an opinion by Justice Rousseau Burch of Kansas in
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). The Kansas rule, in a slightly
different form, became the national standard for political libel cases. New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
189. See, e.g., G. KOLKO, MAIN CURRENTs N AMEmcAN HIsTORY 1-33 (1976); A.
WOLFE, THE LIMnTS OF LEGMMACY passim (1977). For Cooley's changing ideas about
economic regulation, see A. & 0. HooOzNoOm, A HISTORY OF THE ICC 19-38, 188-89
(1976).
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public office does not surrender his private character to the public and he has the same remedy for defamation as before. And
the publication of false and defamatory statements concerning
him, whether relating to his private character or public acts, are
not privileged."' 9 0 This position, of course, represented a significant retreat from the libertarian position taken by Cooley, the
treatise's original author.
During his own judicial career, Thomas Cooley never went
this far toward abandoning treatise-writer Cooley's theories
about freedom of expression and libel law. He never resorted, for
instance, to the tenuous distinction between statements of
"fact" and statements of "opinion" that became the basis for
differentiating between the doctrine of a qualified privilege for
"fair comments" and that of strict liability for libelous misstatements of "fact."''
Nevertheless, Thomas Cooley's published comments indicated that he was revising his optimistic judgment of 1868 that
courts could generally trust the improving quality of American
journalism to solve the dilemmas raised by libel law. 192 Concurring with most other jurists of the late nineteenth century, for
example, Cooley insisted in the fifth edition of Constitutional
Limitations that judges could, and should, draw a sharp line
between libelous publications that involve the "public" sphere
and those that invade the "private" sanctuaries of American
life. ' Most important, his final libel opinions underscored a
crucial point: Thomas Cooley would insist upon using his own
judicial scales to measure the degree to which journalists had
violated the moral and legal limits of the marketplace of ideas.
In 1868, Thomas Cooley had argued that the doctrine of
conditional privilege had been incorporated into the everyday
operation of the marketplace of ideas, if not into American defamation law. Whatever the neo-Blackstonian law of libel might
have said, "the general public sentiment and the prevailing customs" permitted the American press to operate "as though it
were privileged" when it published critical stories about "public
190. 1 T. COOLEY, A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 443 (3d ed. 1906).
191. See Schauer, supra note 45, at 276-81; Titus, supra note 78, passim.
192. CONSTITUTIONAL LiMrATIONS, supra note 9, at 455-56 n.4.
193. On the importance of "private" sanctuaries as a refuge from the disorders of
late nineteenth century life, see B. BLEDSTEIN, supra note 184, at 55-65; R. SENNETT,
FAMILIES AGAINST THE CITY passim (1970).
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events and public men. ' " But by the early 1880s, Justice Cooley was coming to see the law of libel, including the doctrine of
conditional privilege, as a useful legal tool that courts could use
to discourage certain types of journalism as well as to protect
the right of reputation. Although the "general public sentiment
and the prevailing customs" meant that popular journalists
could sell their products, the law of civil libel seemed to offer a
means of "purifying" the marketplace of ideas without the use
of criminal controls.
Thus, Justice Cooley abandoned the view that the intellectual marketplace could be as open and self-regulating as he had
suggested in Constitutional Limitations or in his dissent in
Atkinson. Rather than primarily relying upon the "invisible
hand" of public opinion, Cooley was fully ready to apply the visible hand of the legal system to discourage the type of stories
that, in his view, destroyed the reputations of professionals who
entered public service and the styles of journalism that debased
his version of the moral marketplace. In the end, Thomas Cooley
insisted upon a clear differentiation between journalism that
interested the public and journalism that he believed served the
public interest.195
One of the nineteenth century's most famous exponents of
marketplace liberalism and one of its staunchest libertarians on
the issue of free expression, Thomas Cooley ultimately abandoned a good deal of his 1868 version of marketplace theology.
On the basis of both individual rights (especially the rights of
citizens, including public officials, to their reputations) and general social interests (particularly the public interest in seeing
that private corporations did not fill the marketplace with
socially dangerous libels or pervert it for their own "immoral"
purposes), he came to believe that libel law should help to guide
and direct the flow of ideas. In essence, Justice Cooley and his
colleagues on the Michigan Supreme Court assumed a role similar to that of the United States Supreme Court majority since
the retreat from the romantic marketplace implications of New
194. COsTIrtrmONAL LIMTfATIONS, supra note 9, at 455 n.4.
195. See generally Dennis, The Press and the Public Interest: A Definitional
Dilemma, 23 DE PAUL L. Ruv. 937 (1974). In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1974),
the United States Supreme Court rejected a simple "newsworthiness" test and, in effect,
distinguished between stories in the public interest and those merely of public interest.
For a critique, see Ashdown, supra note 6, at 667-69; note 202 infra.
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York Times Co. v. Sullivan'" 1 and of Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.-as editors of last resort for American
journalism.'"
IV
The lengthy list of "public" libel cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court since 1964 indicates the contemporary relevance of Thomas Cooley's difficulties. The Burger
court in 1974, as Justice Cooley had nearly a century earlier,
retreated from libel doctrines designed to remove the "chilling
effect" of self-censorship. 1 " In response to the specter of a
"thawed out" media, a majority of the Court then attempted to
devise more carefully-crafted doctrines to protect individual reputations and to refurbish what they considered a rather shabby
marketplace of ideas. The problem, as the justices saw it, was
not simply that a broad application of the "actual malice" doctrine of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan would generate publications harmful to individual reputations; equally important,
Sullivan seemed to encourage intellectual products that the justices found shoddily-constructed and improperly-marketed. 1 "9
In the name of ensuring a cleaner, and hopefully more useful, marketplace of ideas, courts assumed a quasi-editorial role.
Thus, they found themselves the ad hoc arbiters of publishers'
motives,'" of their use of language,200 of their judgment in head195.1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

196. For a critical view of such a role, see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. Rxv. 422 (1975). For a general defense of the "retreat," see Robertson,
Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 Tax.
L. Rav. 199 (1976). But see Anderson, A Response to ProfessorRobertson: The Issue is
Control of Press Power, 54 Tnx. L. REv. 271 (1976).
A thorough-going analysis of the libel decisions of the past fifteen years is beyond
the scope of this article. Thus, Section IV infra is intended merely to indicate certain
broad parallels between recent libel cases and those decided by Thomas Cooley and to
suggest possible lines for a critical investigation of recent free expression decisions. For
two attempts to examine the work of the Burger court, see Cox, Freedom of Expression
in the Burger Court, 94 HAav. L. Rav. 1 (1980); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine
and the Burger Court, 68 CAtip. L. Rav. 422 (1980).
197. See Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 5 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 471 (1975).
198. For development of the thesis that the primary goal of the libel decisions of the
mid-1970s was to restrain the press, see Ashdown, supra note 6.
199. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
200. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 682 (W. Va.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975); Anderson, A Response, supra note 196, at 277-82.
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and, inevitably, of the intellectual signifi-

cance of their publications. 202 Critics have rightly charged that
the results of such a judicial process belied the claim of clear

and consistent defamation doctrines.2 03 But as a study of

Thomas Cooley's career should suggest, the problem goes
beyond the Burger court or their failure to construct consistent
rules: it stems from fundamental contradictions within the general system of marketplace liberalism.
As a young man, Thomas Cooley embraced an essentially
romantic view of a liberal, progressive society, in which the maximum release of economic energies and public information contributed to freedom and social betterment.204 But liberalism, as
a body of ideas and a guide for social policy, derived from an
economic and social setting that, in the mid-nineteenth-century
United States, already was being rapidly transformed. The
traditional liberal tenets upon which Cooley based his legal ideas
developed in a society characterized by localistic marketplaces,
small-scale social institutions, and a political culture that
regarded the power of the state as the primary threat to the
individual. By the late nineteenth century, new technological
breakthroughs that created mass production industries, including some manufacturing new cultural products, dramatically
increased both the economic and social scales of life. At the
same time, the growth of corporate capitalism raised the inescapable political problem of excessive private power. The main
tenets of Cooley's "marketplace theology," including his idea
that a marketplace of ideas co-existed in harmony with other
201. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 682-83 (W.
Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975).
202. Clearly, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), a majority of the Court
found the libelous item about a divorce between two prominent socialites to be more a
piece of gossip of interest to readers of TIME'S "Milestones" section than a story in the
general public interest. The majority opinion, however, obscured this editorial judgment
by supposedly focusing upon the issue of the plaintiff's "public" versus "private" status.
This shift in focus from the story to the plaintiff is illusory since the Gertz-Firestone
"public figure" test can still turn upon a person's involvement in "public controversies."
See Frakt, supra note 6, at 585-86.
203. See, e.g., Frakt, supra note 6, at 585-86.

204. By the time Thomas Cooley had published CONsTIrrmuoNAL LIMrrmTiONS, many
of the central tenets of marketplace liberalism already applied to a bygone age. See, e.g.,
E. FoNER, FREE Son., FREE LABOR, FREE MEN passim (1970); R. WELTER, THE MIND OF
AMERICA, 1820-1860 passim (1975). On the lack of a true marketplace of ideas in the
urban newspapers of the mid-nineteenth century, see Pessen, Who Has Power in the
Democratic Capitalistic Community? Reflections on Antebellum New York City, 52
N.Y. HIsT. 129, 145 (1977).
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marketplaces, no longer explained this environment. Yet, Cooley

and other American liberals clung to the outlines of their old
faiths, struggling to adapt them to new conditionso ° Thus, in
defamation law, Cooley spent his judicial career trying to reconcile his Jacksonian models of free expression and "the moral

marketplace" to the new realities of corporate publishing and
popular journalism. He tried, in brief, to reconcile the
irreconcilable.
Justice Cooley's quest for a consistent marketplace
approach to defamation law ultimately bogged him down in tenuous legal distinctions. The contradictions that he tried to paste
together, far from being resolved by subsequent judges and theorists, have only become more severe. In the landmark Gertz
decision of 1974, for example, the Burger court decided that
judges must intervene more actively in the marketplace of ideas
in order to correct the sins of American journalism; yet during
the same term, the Court fell back upon the romantic images of
ink-stained printers and the shibboleth of "editorial judgment"
to rebuff Professor Barron's plea for re-adjusting the marketplace of ideas through the use of right-of-reply laws.2 "e The following term, the Court issued the Firestone decision, 0 7 which
mandated even deeper judicial incursions into the marketplace,
and into editorial judgment, than Gertz did, and then it
returned to the old doctrines of "marketplace theology" in order
to confer a limited first amendment status on the least open stall
in the intellectual marketplace-commercial speech. 208
205. See P.GoLDSTONz, THE RISE Am FALL OF THE LIBERAL EMPIRE (1977); J.
HABERMAS, LEGrIMATION CRISIS (1975); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979);
R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & PoLrCS (1975); A. WOLFE, supra note 189; R.P. WoLn, Tmz
PovERTY OF LIBERALISM (1968).

206. Jerome Barron's attempt to gain recognition of a constitutional right of reply,
as part of his continuing attack on the Court's adoption of a "romantic" view of the
marketplace of ideas, failed to persuade a single member of the Court. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Even a supporter of the theory, as well as
the reality, of the marketplace of ideas and a believer in the power of editorial judgment
has observed that Chief Justice Burger's opinion in the Tornillo case relied more upon
"rhetorical flourishes" than "reasoned explanation." Bezanson, Herbert v. Lando, Editorial Judgment, and Freedom of the Press: An Essay, 1978 IL. L.F. 605, 608.
207. See Frakt, supra note 6, at 531.
208. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 828-29 (1975). This essay
is not the place for a lengthy excursion into the implications of the new commercial
speech doctrines, especially when their precise boundaries remain unclear. See, e.g.,
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). But the
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Liberals can, of course, throw their hands up and do their
best to blur the contradictions in modern liberalism, but they
can never escape them.2 09 Defamation law provides an excellent
example. Any set of defamation rules that seeks to expand "free
speech" by removing the general threat of self-censorship will
not, by some automatic process, increase the flow of ideas and
information to buyers within some mythical marketplace of
ideas. But there can be no doubt that policies such as those
enunciated by Thomas Cooley in Atkinson and by the Supreme
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan would confer very
real, and economically valuable, privileges upon the people who
own the210media and upon the journalists who help to create
"news."
On the other hand, attempts to intervene, through
the use of libel law, will necessarily undermine some of the basic
tenets of marketplace theology. Tougher ad hoc decisions will do
more than produce greater pre-publication care by the press.
They will, in one way or another, not only limit the flow of information to the consumers of news but also will, in effect, produce
a kind of judicially-created index of illegal words and phrases.2 11
Court's use of marketplace analogies in the commercial speech area does help to highlight the inherent contradictions in the entire liberal marketplace framework. For an
extended critique, see Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom,
62 IowA L. Rav. 1 (1976).
Even if one concedes that the interest the Court is protecting is that of listeners
(consumers) rather than speakers (advertisers)-see Note, The Right to Receive and the
Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo L.J. 775
(1975)-one must still confront the argument that commercial speech, even when "nondeceptive" and "truthful," remains a "distorted" form of communication. See S. EwE,
CPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1976). For a discussion of "distorted" communication, see
C. MuELLER, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNICATION passim (1973).
209. The late Alexander Bickel, for example, fully acknowledged the contradictions
in the first amendment decisions of the 1970s, but then retreated to a ritualistic pluralism-his version of the political marketplace-as the only solution. A. BicKEL, Domesticated Civil Disobedience: The First Amendment, from Sullivan to the PentagonPapers,
in THE MORALYr OF CONSENr 57, 86-87 (1975). Such an approach, as Professor Silver has
noted, marked a significant retreat from the earlier position of Professor Bickel and
other advocates of "reasoned" decisions. SELvER, The Warren Court Critics: Where Are
They Now That We Need Them?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 409-19 (1976).
210. This was the gist of Professor Barron's criticism of the libel decisions of the
1960s and early 1970s. See J. BARRON, FitzDoM OF THE PRESS FoR WHOM? 7-12, 340-41
(1973); Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System and the Flow of
Information to the Justices: A PreliminaryInquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187, 1204-07 (1975).
211. See Schauer, supra note 45, at 276-87, 291-94. Compare the more overt examples of governmentally-sanctioned language in C. Mueller, supra, note 208, at 30-32, 3739. The problems, of course, do not end here. The impact of governmental intrusion, for
example, is hardly neutral. The public-private distinction, for instance, means that journalists and papers who investigate the role of "private" individuals, such as heads of

1980]

Thomas M. Cooley

Legal history can provide no clear map of future courses,
but the study of the past can offer valuable perspectives as to
where we have come and where we might go."2 The case of
Thomas Cooley, hopefully, provides a clearer perspective on the
many "crooked paths" that lie before us in this post-liberal age.
Nonetheless, any search for more rational and equitable
approaches to issues of free expression must surely move beyond
the paths of marketplace liberalism.1 3
large corporations, have less legal protection than those who deal with more traditional
stories involving governmental officials. See Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between
Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. REv. 785, 841-42 (1979).
212. On the value of legal history, see J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW
152-67 (1976).
213. Defending the viability of the marketplace of ideas, in both theory and practice, Professor Bezanson invokes the authority of "basic and widely accepted doctrines of
communication theory." Bezanson, supra note 192, at 614. Although it is impossible to
find a single, coherent alternative to the marketplace model espoused by Professor
Bezanson's sources, many of which were published nearly twenty years ago, communications research is not nearly as one-dimensional as he claims. See, e.g., J. ELLUL, THE
POLImCAL ILLUSION 96-135 (1967); J. ELLuL, PROPAGANDA (1965); E. EPSTEIN, BETWEEN
FACT AND FICTION: THE PROBLEM OF JOURNALISM (1975); E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM
NOWHERE (1973); A. GOULDNER, supra note 45, at 138; C. MUELLER, supra note 208; H.
SCHILLER, COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE DOMINATION (1976); H. SCHLLER, THE MIND
MANAGERS (1973); Christians & Real, Jacques Ellul's Contributions to Critical Media
Theory, 29 J. COM. 83 (1979); Enzensberger, Constituents of a Theory of the Media,
1964 NEW LEFT REV. 13 (1970); Habermas, On Systematically Distorted Communication, 13 INQUIRY 205 (1970); Habermas, Towards a Theory of Communicative Competency, 13 INQUIRY 360 (1970); McCarthy, A Theory of Communicative Competency, 3
PHILOSOPHY SOC. ScI. 135 (1973) (analyzing Jurgen Habermas' theory of "the ideal
speech situation").
It would be naive, of course, to underestimate the dangers of a. post-liberal age, especially in the realm of free expression. Alvin Gouldner, one of the most perceptive critics
of liberal society, for example, argues that Habermas' "ideal speech situation," while
focusing on the distortions of communication grounded in private property, glosses over
the problem of state domination. A. GouLDNRm, supra note 45, at 150-52, 164-65. Yet, the
vision of a world beyond liberalism can-and must-include a society in which citizens
enjoy a true freedom of expression. See, e.g., id. at 160; R. UNGER, supra note 205, at
280-81. For an extended argument that there will be nothing but "crooked paths" out of
the liberal present, see P. CLEcAK, CROOKED PATHS: REFLECTION ON SOCLISM, CONSERVATISM, AND THE WELFARE STATE (1977); and on the impossibility of avoiding the trip down
these paths, beyond liberalism, see R. UNGER, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 266-68 (1976).
Any adequate alternative to the market theory of free expression must extend protection
beyond the public sphere into other areas such as the workplace. See R. PFEFFER, WORKING FOE CAPIrrALSM passim (1979). Finally, theories by themselves will prove of little use
unless they are connected to organized efforts to bring about significant social and political change. See A. GOULDNER, supra note 45, at 155-60; Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the
American Way: An Interpretationof Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx.
L. REv. 1307, 1345, 1359 (1979). For a historical study of the Populist movement of the

late nineteenth century, see L. GOODWYN,

DEMOCRATIC PROMISE

(1976). The Populist cru-

sade, especially in the efforts of grass-roots "lecturers" and small town newspaper editors, offered a good example of the power of non-distorted communication. See id. at 87-
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107, 351-86. The larger experience of Populism, however, demonstrated the obstacles--in
both the political and intellectual "marketplaces"-to significant social change. Id. at
515-55.

